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Nepal has been facing issues of the geographical maldistribution of physicians since past 
years. The various documentation has been about the reason for brain drain to abroad but, 
only little is known about the salient factors that influence the choice of location either 
rural or urban setting for those doctors who do not migrate. In recent years, the production 
of medical doctors within Nepal is increasing trend with growing medical colleges, but 
their distribution in rural locations is not adequate. There is a huge discrepancy to the 
doctors to population in rural versus urban area. So, the purpose of this study was to 
analyse the major factors that influence the choice of urban or rural location for the future 
clinical practice of Nepalese doctors and to identify the appropriate policy to address the 
problem and try to solve it to some extent. To study the problem, the system dynamics 
modelling approach was used in order to analyse the distribution trend of doctors in rural 
versus urban location and to replicate the problematic behavioural trend.  
 
The model reveals the feedback mechanism of the most influential factors for doctors’ 
resistance not to go and practice in rural setting. The effects of learning opportunities 
from their experienced seniors, effects of the additional income from the dual practice 
and effects of work stress and job satisfaction on the migration from rural to urban drives 
the entire distribution of doctors in the model. The model managed to replicate the 
problematic behavior.   The wishful thinking rather than the actual policy is developed o 
in order to relieve the problem. 
 
This thesis consists mainly six sections with relevant subheading. The introduction part 
deals with the background about the problem and  problematic behavior of doctors to 
population in urban and rural setting due to  the uneven distribution of doctors in those 
location of Nepal while the relevant  literatures and studies relating to the pull and push 
factors for internal migration is in the literature review section together with the 
introduction to the system dynamics methodology used. The next section validates the 
structure and behavior produced by simulation to build confidence in the model. The 
model behavior section deal the simulation results with explanation to how the structure 




Thinking” is proposed, and the policy structure is developed and behavior is analysed to 
address the problematic behaviour is described in the policy section. The concluding 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Human Resources for Health (HRH) are an important factor for the development of health 
care system of any nation. But the ongoing global trend of migration of the health care 
worker, especially the doctors, from medically less served to better served areas has 
created the unbalanced distribution of health personnel between and within countries. The 
uneven distribution exists due to both internal migration (usually from a rural to an urban 
setting) and external migration (from developing to developed countries).This severe 
geographic imbalances in the availability of health workers has been a longstanding and 
serious issues worldwide affecting countries at all levels of income, whether its 
developing countries like Nepal or developed countries. Figure 1. exhibits the mismatch 
of physicians to population health in different geographic regions considered as the most 
commonly named current human resource policy concern in the health sector across 
OECD countries (Ono et al., 2014) 
 
Figure 1. Current issue in physician supply 
(Adapted from: Ono, Schoenstein, & Buchan, 2014) 
Nepal is no exception. Nepal is among the world’s poorest countries with a population of 
approximately 29 million with 82% of the population living in rural areas and 25.2% 




administratively divided into seven provinces with each province having rural 
municipalities (called Gaunpalika) and urban municipalities (called Nagarpalika) 
(Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP), 2010). The country spends 5.3% of its gross 
domestic product (GDP) on health. In terms of medical facility allocation, Nepalese have 
0.08 health centres per 100,000 population and 2 Doctors of Modern Medicine per 10,000 
population (P Ravi Shankar, 2010). 
In last two decades, Nepal is considered to have made remarkable progress in 
health sector. Nepalese’s life expectancy at birth has increased to 70.77 years in 2017 
compared to 50 years in 1981. Similarly, between 2000 and 2016, neo-natal mortality fell 
from 39 to 21 deaths per 1,000 live births, infant mortality rate declined from 64 to 32 
deaths per 1,000 live births and under-five mortality decreased from 91 to 39 deaths per 
1,000 live births. Likewise, the maternal mortality ratio decreased from 548 per 100,000 
live births in 2000 to 239 in 2016 (Table 1). Despite these achievements, substantial 
inequities in health outcomes across different geographic regions and socioeconomic 
groups persist (Ministry of Finance, 2012).  
Indicator 
Year 
2001 2006 2011 2015/2016 
Total fertility rate 4.1 3.1 2.6 2.3 
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 64 48 46 32 
Urban-five mortality rate( per 100 live births) 91 48 46 39 
Antenatal care (by skilled provider percentage) 28 44 58 84 
Deliver care (by skilled provider percentage) 11 29 36 58 
Maternal mortality rate (maternal deaths per 
100,000blive births) 548 425 328 239 
Stunting rate(percentage of children under 5 age) 
years) 57 49 41 36 
Wasting rate (percentage of children under 5 
age) 11 13 11 19 
Underweight rate percentage of children under 
age 5 years) 43 39 29 27 
Table 1. Indicators of major health outcomes in Nepal 
Source: Tamang, Poudel, Karki, & Gautam (2020). 
As stated by Nepal Medical Council, there are approximately 20 medical colleges that 




of Finance1, the number of registered medical graduates have increased considerably 
from 3,928 to 21,033 from fiscal year 2001/2002 to 2018/2019, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Total registered doctors in Nepal (Source: MOF 2018/2019) 
Although Nepal exhibits a considerable increase in number of doctors every year, the 
ratio of physicians per 10,000 people in Nepal is far below the standard of 23 health 
service providers per 10,000 people set by World Health Organization (World Health 
Organization, 2006). Despite these improvements and increasing health workers, 
especially doctors, Nepal faces a shortage of doctors  and an most importantly uneven 
distribution of doctors between andbetween rural and urban areas of the country. One of  
the reason for the shortage of doctors, in general,  in  Nepal can be associated with ‘brain 
drain’ of qualified medical doctors, with more than 500 doctors emigrating each year, 
making it difficult for the country to maintain even supply of doctors (Ministry of Health 
and Population, 2017a). 
The report of Ministry of Health and Population (2012), states that there are 
sufficient number of doctors in Nepal and is expected to rise. But the main problem lies 














communities that need them most. More often it is said that oversupply of doctors did not 
result in equal distribution between urban and rural areas. 
Another primary factor for the shortage of health workers is the increasing number 
of health personnel seeking employment abroad. Historically, doctors’ brain drain in 
Nepal is found to begin several years ago (World Health Organization, 2006). However, 
presumably the doctors’ brain drain in Nepal has intensified in recent years, especially 
due to ‘external brain drain’. The Ministry of Health and Population (2017), report that 
an estimated 16 percent of registered Nepali doctors were outside the country, either 
studying or working. Moreover, doctors staying in Nepal are more likely to practice in 
urban area which has been a challenge in deployment and retention of all the health 
workers in rural Nepal. A survey of career intentions of medical students in Nepal showed 
that 88% of medical students were likely to practice in urban centers (Huntington et al., 
2012). 
Since, it is noted that the absence of doctors and qualified health professionals in 
the most remote areas has also been a longstanding issue. These issues are stimulated by 
the movement of high-level health workers, such as doctors, to urban areas or abroad, 
mainly due to better career opportunities, financial incentives, working environment,  
better employment prospects for health professionals and their spouse, easier access to 
private practice,  better infrastructure, and more social amenities than rural 
areas.(Ministry of Health and Population, 2017a). 
There have been tremendous efforts by Nepal’s Ministry of Education (MOE) to 
address the issue of low physician density in rural Nepal. A scheme of 10% scholarship 
are provided to the student in private medical schools owned by a Nepali citizen and 
medical schools in Nepal, owned by non-citizens, must reserve 20% of seats each session 
for free education of students. This scholarship binds students to serve 2 years in rural 
part after graduation. However, the impact of such program have been effective, in the 
short-term, to place into rural areas but after their mandatory rural service completion 
they go to abroad for better opportunities (Ministry of Health and Population, 2017b) 
An article by (Huntington et al., 2012)) states that the tuition fees of private 
medical colleges are relatively expensive, three private medical schools averaged about 




capita income of GDP in Nepal. By contrast, the government subsidized tuition fees at 
the IOM are only about US$2400 for the same 5.5-year program. Thus, the new graduates 
of health workers are distributed in private hospitals in urban areas and publicly run 
government hospital in remote areas. Though expansion of new graduates is possible 
from these kind of scholarship schemes but due to the limited number of residency 
positions in Nepal preferred specialty, these health workers seek to go abroad for further 
training and study after completion of their obliged practice in rural or urban area. The 
other various financial incentive like remote allowance packages were also introduced for 
accepting the job in a rural and remote area in order to retain the doctors (Tamang et al., 
2020). Apart from these initiatives, there were no programs to address the retention of 
health workers within the country. 
 Shankar (2010) mentioned in his findings that the health workers’ migration from 
Nepal is a major problem that leaves the country with maldistribution of health workers. 
There are various factors behind the shortage and disparity in the distribution of doctors 
between urban to rural which have not yet been studied in a systematically. Thus, this 
study aims to identify influence of different financial and non-financial factors that causes 
the disparity in urban and rural distribution doctors using system dynamic approach. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Nepal has a remarkable progress in health sector with production of sufficient health 
workers (Ministry of Health and Population, 2012). Despite an of HRH production, the 
"brain drain" of health workers has been identified as a major concern in Nepal (Dussault 
& Franceschini, 2006). These shortages have led Nepal to experiences uneven 
distribution of health workers leading to critical shortage of health workers in most rural 
part of the country with highly concentration on urban cities like Kathmandu, Pokhara 
and Chitwan. This leaves the health worker-to-population ratio at 0.67 doctors and nurses 
per 1,000 individuals, which is significantly lower than the World Health Organization’s 
recommendation of 2.3 doctors, nurses and midwives per 1,000 individuals (Ministry of 
Health and Population, 2017a). Based on above context, the uneven distribution of health 
workers in Nepal is problematic in nature which the present study attempts to understand 




There has been large numbers of internal migration studies including high income 
countries or developing countries like Nepal which are more  theoretical and descriptive 
in nature (Huntington et al., 2012), (Hayes & Shakya, 2013), (Ailuogwemhe et al., 2005) 
(Dussault & Franceschini, 2006), and so on which has contributed to update the 
knowledge about underlying causes of internal migration by providing the trends or 
statistical data. However, there are only few studies that developed the model using 
system dynamics based on those theories which only explains the causal relationships 
between key variables. Most empirical studies use data and statistical analyses to measure 
the impact of internal migration on health outcomes. The majority of these research’s 
findings are merely descriptive in nature and lack a solid foundation for policy analysis 
and design. Therefore, this research tries to explore the patterns of the uneven distribution 
of doctors’ in urban and rural areas of Nepal, the causes of such flow, some consequences 
and introduce the various policies options to address the problem of shortages of doctors 
to the policymakers. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
The research objective and questions have been formulated based on the above-
mentioned problem description. The main aim of this thesis is to enhance the better 
understanding of the underlying structure that influences and governs Nepalese medical 
doctor’s internal migration dynamics. The study has tried to represent the current 
structure of the Nepalese medical doctors using the system dynamic models with 
connection to different causes of internal migration. Moreover, this study aims to examine 
the major determinants of the geographical imbalances of the medical doctors i.e. push 
and pull factors that drive the patterns of internal migration. The study also attempts 
provide policy suggestion to address government policy by identifying, exploring and 
explaining different factors that influence the migration decisions. 
Therefore, the specific objective is stated below; 
• To explore the dynamics for uneven distribution of medical graduates among 
urban and rural part of Nepal. 
Based on the objective, a system dynamics model will be developed, and the simulated 




The following are the research questions formulated: 
• What are the key factors that impact the inequitable geographical distribution of 
medical doctors and how these factors might be addressed to improve retention 
rates? 
• What are the factors influencing a medical doctors’ decision to relocate, stay or 
leave a post in rural or remote areas and move to urban areas of Nepal? 
1.4 Research Methodology  
In order to fulfill the research objective a quantitative system dynamic modeling and 
simulation-based analysis approach is adopted. This modelling approach allows us to 
represent and understand relevant interactions between different causes and their effects. 
In that way, it is possible to facilitate a variety of formal analyses that enhance our 
understanding of interaction between factors that affect internal migration of doctors. 
Thus, a System dynamics approach has been used as the methodological tool to 
understands the stated research problem. SD has been developed specifically to facilitate 
the analysis of the relationship between the structure and behavior in such complex 
feedback systems (Sterman, 2000). SD allows studying the relationship that exists 
between structure and behavior in complex and dynamic systems, so as to understand the 
structural origin of a problematic dynamic development and to identify policies for the 
purpose of modifying that development (Sterman, 2000).  
And for research strategy mixed method approach has been used where both qualitative 
and quantitative data has been deployed. For the purpose of the study, secondary data has 
been used mostly with limited insights from working doctors as qualitative inputs. The 
major sources of secondary data are from publication by various health administration 
bodies in Nepal. 
1.5 Reference Mode 
In order to address the first research question, the reference mode is necessary to show 
the historical trends on the number of medical doctors in Nepal.  The recent data shows 
that there is an increasing trend of medical doctors’ production with rapid medical school 




et al., 2008) the physician ratio is 2.4 physicians per 100,000 people about 100 times 
lower than the minimum acceptable ratio stated by WHO (World Health Organization, 
2006). Despite an improvement in the ratio from 1.61 to 7.5 per 10,000 population is 
observed in Figure 3., it cannot be considered an equitable distribution due to discrepancy 
in the medical doctors’ density in rural vs urban areas of Nepal as shown in the Figure 4. 
Therefore, the doctors to population ratio are computed by total number of medical 
doctors registered divided by total number of populations. 
 
Figure 3. Doctors to Population ratio (“00000) 
Data source: MOF (2001-2018) & United Nations - World Population Prospects 
https://population.un.org/wup/Country-Profiles/ 
The report from UN2 states that, the population in rural areas decreased from 86.6 percent 
(2001) to 80.26 percent (2018). In comparison, between 2001 and 2018, the number of 
physicians in rural areas increased from 1,571 to 8,413 indicating an improvement in the 
situation. Nonetheless, when the ratio between urban to rural are compared, we see that 
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about 40 times that in rural Nepal (Pathiyil Ravi Shankar, 2017) despite being an 
improvement, cannot be considered an even distribution of medical doctors. 
This ratio is calculated as total number of rural doctors divided by the number of the rural 
population commonly referred to as the rural doctors to rural population ratio. Similarly, 
for urban doctors to urban population ratio, it is calculated as total number of urban 
doctors divided by the number of the urban population. The reference mode for the study 
is based on data available on the Ministry of Finance (MOF)3 Nepal as shown in below 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Urban doctors to urban population and Rural doctors to rural population 
ratio (00,000) 
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Chapter 2: Literature Overview and Methodology 
2.1 Literature Review 
The international and internal mobility of health workers is not a recent trend. In their 
study Araújo & Maeda (2013) identified that, throughout the world, there is a tendency 
for the health workforce to be concentrated in well off urban areas rather than in rural and 
poorer areas. It was noted that excessive migration of doctors from rural areas to urban 
pocket has intensified the severe imbalances in the distribution of health care workers 
across and within countries. 
In Bangladesh, 35 percent of the doctors and 30 percent of the nurses practicing in the 
public sector are in metropolitan areas which contain only 15 percent of the country’s 
population (Dussault & Franceschini, 2006). In Sudan, the doctor to population ratio in 
urban settings is 24 times higher than in rural locations, the same indicator for nurses is 
20 times higher in urban locations (Lemiere et al., 2011). In the same way, the Kathmandu 
valley has one doctor for 850 people but in rural areas the number is one doctor for every 
150,000 people4. The doctor-population density in Kathmandu is estimated to be about 
40 times that in rural Nepal (Ailuogwemhe et al., 2005). Thus, the problem of rural 
recruitment and retention of health workers is a world-wide issue affecting countries at 
all levels of income.  These inequitable distribution of medical doctors or health workers 
can contribute to great disparities in health outcomes between rural and urban population.  
The pattern of migration of health workers relevant in Nepal is shown in the Figure 5. 
This explains the patterns of movement for medical doctors too. The medical doctors are 
likely to move from rural areas to either urban public sector or urban private sector or 
secondary and tertiary level public sector. Whereas from these different sectors, the 
movement of medical doctors are extended to the rich country health sector. 
 
4 Patan Academy of Health Sciences. Nepal at a glance. [Cited November 18, 2017]. 





Figure 5.Schematic of the factors affecting the migration and movement of health 
workers. 
Source: Adapted from study of(Ailuogwemhe et al., 2005) 
(Zurn et al., 2002) identified that the urban areas are more attractive due to the 
opportunities they offer in terms of career development and educational advancement, 
better employment opportunities, easier access to private practice (an important factor in 
countries where public salaries are low) and lifestyle related services and amenities, and 
better access to education opportunities for their children. With this there are some cases 
of over staffing in urban areas; whereas in rural areas there are understaffing of medical 
doctors. Paradoxically, instead of encouraging movement of staff towards rural areas, 
excess number of health professionals in urban areas often promote external “brain drain” 
(Dussault & Franceschini, 2006). It is too be noted in Nepal, there are large numbers of 
vacant posts (47.3%) for medical officers in all districts. Staff vacancies and absenteeism 
are common with only 85% of sanctioned posts filled and only 70% are present, others 
presence is questionable (Ministry of Health and Population, 2012). 
There are different factors for different health care workers categories.  The high skilled 
workers like medical doctors are reluctant to work in urban and wealthier places possibly 
because of the high cost of education and hence desire to earn the higher income. As 
noted in research paper (Huntington et al., 2012) “Neo-classical economics theory 




wage rates between locations, suggesting that migration is mainly an individual decision 
taken to maximize income”.  The barriers factors in rural practice include career 
development incentives, rewards or recognition, mentoring and supervision, salary and 
remuneration that influences the choice of practice location (Brooks et al., 2002). In 
Nepal, a qualitative study of rural generalist physicians identified many of these same 
factors (Butterworth et al., 2008). There are other multiple push and pull actors 
influencing a medical doctor for the choice of selection of practice area. 
 
Figure 6. Schematic of the factors affecting migration 
Source: Adapted from study of (Ailuogwemhe et al., 2005). 
The “pull” factors are those that attract health professionals for a given post/location 
(higher income or possibility of practicing in the private sector, improved working and 
living conditions, and etc.). The “push” factors are those that may coercively influence 
the health workers not to take up a post in a remote location and not to remain there 
(Lehmann et al., 2008). Araújo & Maeda (2013) explained in their paper that the pull 
factors associated with migration include higher salaries, better working and living 
conditions, more opportunities for continuing education and career development. The 
push factors may include limited job opportunities (both financial and professional) in 




Based on the various empirical evidences the following are the listed factors that have 
varying degree of influences on the employment of decision of medical doctors which are 
briefly explained below: 
1. Learning Opportunities 
The study in Ghana demonstrates that lack of career development and mentoring by 
specialists and senior doctors was the most critical disincentive for doctors to work in 
remote or rural postings. The absence of senior posts in rural areas, lack of recognition 
from managers and slower career progression are other factors associated with the feeling 
of “professional imprisonment” identified by those working in rural and remote posts in 
Ghana. The same study in Ghana shows the evidence in rural periphery lacks access to 
continuing education (professional courses and workshops) is limited to those not 
working in the urban areas. (Snow et al., 2011).  
(Butterworth et al., 2008) identified career and promotion prospects along with 
continuing medical education as some factors that affected the recruitment and retention 
of medical doctors in rural areas. They stated that rural facilities lack internet access to 
attend various conferences that helps them to build their career. Most of the young doctors 
felt professional isolation and lack of cooperation by other permanent government health 
workers including senior doctors who treated them poorly that affects the motivation to 
deployed from rural practice. 
2. Income and Salary 
Salary and renumeration significantly influences the decision to work. Since, the urban 
places offer the opportunities for dual practice i.e. private practice to supplement their 
income and increase job satisfaction, which are less available in rural areas, thus there are 
high chances that medical doctors are motivated to practice in metropolitan areas. It is 
evident from the study in Bangladesh that if non-private-practice allowance are given to 
medical doctors, there are high chances that the young medical doctors job preferences 
will be in rural areas. A study in Nepal by (Huntington et al., 2012) provided an evidence  
that medical students who came from families with higher incomes have greater 
likelihood of practicing abroad  because of good salary which is considered as a very 




salary in Nepal.  In the same study of medical students in our country, two thirds agreed 
to the statement that ‘Additional payments from the government would make me more 
likely to practice in a rural area’. 
Another study by (P Ravi Shankar, 2010) also found that high tuition fees in private 
medical schools and low Government wages prevent recent graduates from taking up 
rural positions. As per (Tamang et al., 2020) the other motivation factors to stay in rural 
areas were rural allowances, opportunities for training and preparation time for the 
postgraduate exam. Study by (Hayes & Shakya, 2013) identified good salary (“much 
more than in Kathmandu”) as important factor to attract the medical doctors to work in 
rural areas. (Thapa et al., 2014) (Rockers et al., 2011) and (Miranda et al., 2012) also 
suggested that doubling of the salary and incentives would make rural postings  more 
attractive.  
3. Work Pressure and Job Satisfaction 
The physicians experiences a lot work stress in terms of long work hours , low supply of 
doctors, overcrowding with patients, lack of proper sleep due to night shifts , many 
patients to be treated and relatively low in comparison to the standard income per patients 
treated and other factors like confrontation with illness and death on a daily basis and so 
on. These work pressure has been found to affect job satisfaction and in turn increases 
turnover intensity. (Khan et al., 2003) also explained that work pressure leads toward 
leaving the job. Due to too much of work, doctors feel dissatisfaction, dissatisfied 
physicians are more likely to leave the job (Khan et al., 2003). The study of (Yu et al., 
2015) revealed work stress as negatively correlated  to job satisfaction and had a positive 
effect on turnover intention.  
2.2 System dynamics approach as Methodology 
As per Sterman (2000), system dynamics has been developed specifically to facilitate the 
analysis of the relationship between the structure and behavior in such complex feedback 
systems under uncertainty. The behavior of any system or entity is principally caused by 
its structure. The model validation is done in order to evaluate and test the different 
theoretical hypotheses about how the model structure produces its behavior by comparing 




This research aims to construct an SD integrative model that captures the dynamics of 
Nepalese Medical doctors’ internal migration. The model will give insights on the major 
feedback loops the underlying causes for such behaviour of Nepalese medical doctors. 
The model is the demonstration of hypotheses we have developed that explains about 
reason on what happened and why, based on different relevant migration theories. 
Moreover, the upon analysis of the model structure and behaviour, the various policy 
options, its feasibility, policy costs, implementation challenges, and best policy fit are 
designed that aims to solve the problem of geographical imbalances on distribution of 
medical doctors. 
Since system dynamics models use people‟s mental models (mental representations of 
reality) as a source of data along with written data and numerical data, the present research 
engaged both qualitative and quantitative research strategies. The numerical data was 
obtained by secondary data collection methods, i.e. from statistical reports and other 
government publications. Among the primary sources of data were brief talk with people 
from medical background on the influential factors for migration or relocation of practice 
location. 
The system dynamics method has been applied to issues of population health since the 
1970s. (Homer & Hirsch, 2006), (Hassan & Minato, 2017) has applied system dynamics 
in Malaysian Healthcare resources and explained that the application of the system 
dynamics model provides a framework for understanding the feedback structure and the 
complex system of the components in healthcare resources. Various studies have adopted 
system dynamics methodology on healthcare issues over the years, mostly covering 
countries in developed regions and has been claimed as a useful tool in health care 
research like Malaysian health care resources (Hassan & Minato, 2017), Forecasting the 
absolute and relative shortage of physicians in Japan (Ishikawa et al., 2013) and 
Transformation of potential medical demand in China: A system dynamics simulation 
model (Yu et al., 2015) and so on. Similarly, this work is also based on System dynamic 
modelling approach, a methodology and computer simulation modeling technique for 
framing, under- standing and discussing complex issues and problems. In the current 





Chapter 3: Model Description and Simulation 
3.1 Model Overview 
This chapter describes the simulation models ́ structure and explains how the different 
literature theories applied are used in the model. In addition to these, it also describes the 
dynamics generated in the model during the simulation time frame. The three different 
sectors of the model in terms of stocks flows and how majors structure formulations are 
developed has been explained in detail and the interactions between them. The following 
are the model’s different sectors that were developed which generated the dynamics in 
the system: 
• Medical student sector 
• General Doctor framework sector 
• Vacancy for rural positions 
• Learning effect 
• Additional salary and income effect 
• Work pressure and Job satisfaction effect 
• Population sector 
After this, causal loop diagram has been constructed for defining framework in less 
detailed perspective explaining the major feedback loops and their interactions. The 
documentation of the model that explains the values and their sources can be found in 
Appendix A.  After that the relevant policy has been introduced in the model to solve the 
problem stated. Furthermore, the relevant policy choice has been explained in Chapter 6. 
The time horizon for the explanatory model simulation is from 2001 till 2018. As stated 
by Generally, the modeller should back trace the data from historical trend in order to 
develop the reference mode of behaviour. A time frame of 20 years is added to analyse 
the effects of policy on the model behaviour. In order to evaluate the policy model runs 




3. 2 Model Assumptions 
This section provides the explanation to the overall set of assumptions made throughout 
the modelling process. It defines the scope and boundary of the model. The following 
points highlights the basic assumptions made in the model: 
3.2.1 Assumption 1: system boundaries 
The important exogeneous variable in this modelling process is: 
• FRACTIONAL INCREASE IN MEDICAL COLLEGE SEATS CAPACITY 
Ministry of Education (MOE) of Nepal determined the number of medical 
students recruited each year from secondary schools. With the gradual increase in 
the number of medical colleges further capacity expansion was planned and 
therefore the model was parameterised with an average rate of percent on medical 
seats capacity for medical students per year, a number which applies across the 
model’s 18-year time horizon. 
• RESERVATION QUOTA SEATSs also assumed as exogenous. Every year the 
medical colleges provide the reservation quota seats (as mentioned in Scholarship 
rules 2060), as self-paying seats or scholarship seats for students. Further, the 
scholarship seats are divided into merit scholarship quota with fraction of 
scholarship reserved for special provision and out of total scholarship seats, the 
remaining seats are for merit scholarship quota. These scholarship seats are an 
attempt of government to address the issues of lack of doctors in rural area and 
prevent the doctors from emigrating through the compulsory bonding service 
program. These reservation quotas are allocated for disadvantaged socioeconomic 
group like remote background students. This scheme increases the rural doctor 
placement for at least a period of 2 years in rural area. 
3.2.2 Assumption 2: definition of rural and urban areas.  
There are many available definitions in the literature. As per the (Muula, 2007) 
explanation that ‘a universal definition of a rural area is not possible’. Therefore, the 
definition concluded by (Couper, 2003) “as rural cannot be defined as non- urban’, to 




metropolitan centres where there is not ready access to specialist 
intensive and/or high technology care...’’ is accepted. In our context, the data are collected 
from various sources so that the data on which we rely may not follow the definition as 
we have accepted here. 
3.2.4 Assumption 4: Aging Chain of Doctors 
We have assumed that doctors move along the aging chain through three stocks:  rookies, 
semi-experienced and experienced, both for rural and urban setting. We chose to split the 
labour force in three group in order to show that doctors can choose two different types 
of paths after spending some time and gaining experience in their workplace either to stay 
or re-locate from rural to urban setting or vice versa on the basis of different decision 
variables under different stages of aging chain. 
3.2.5 Assumption 5: Distinction between Registered Doctors and Practising Doctors 
Sum of total rural and urban doctor does not match the total historical doctors. It is due 
to the fact the historical data of doctor account the total medical graduates who have 
obtained medical license after passing the NMC exams. But Total doctor calculated in 
using Total Doctor convertor only account for the total doctor currently employed in the 
rural and urban areas since register doctor are there in as doctor but are not allotted for 
rural or urban practice. 
3.2.6 Assumption 6: Determinants of migration 
Numerous factors determine the migration of the doctors between urban and rural areas 
(Zurn et al., 2002).  All of these factors are not considered to specify model boundary and 
better understand some key determinant. Factors associated with additional financial 
income, learning opportunities and workload stress are considered as the main driving 
variables for the doctors’ decision to migrate based on the literature reviewed on Chapter 
2. 
3.2.7 Assumption 7: Historical behaivor of total, rural and urban doctors 
It should be noted that the urban doctors to urban population ratio and rural doctors to 
rural population ratio, total registered doctors and total medical college capacity used for 




urban doctors and rural doctors are 40% and 60% respectively based on the literature 
review and do not represent and exact data. Nevertheless, Total doctor represent the actual 
data which is distributed at 40:60 proportion between rural and urban based on the 
evidences from literature. It reflects only percentage representation while the real 
numbers of doctors in urban and rural throughout Nepal are unknown. Secondly, the 
initial value for the medical college capacity are estimated through backward calculation 
based on the year of establishment from college official website taking the reference value 
of year 2018 and 2019. 
The data for total registered medical doctors was available for year 2000, year 2005, year 
2008 and from year 2012 to year 2018 only, so the numbers in between the years were 
estimated using growth rate calculation as GR= (present year/past year)1/n-1) (further 
discussed in detail in the methodology part).  
3.3 Model Structure 
This section contains a detailed discussion of each components of the simulation models’ 
structure in align with different theories applied and gives an explanation to how problem 
behaviour could be replicated without a policy structure. The different sectors of the 
model structure and the interactions between them is explained in detail. 
3.3.1 Medical student sector 
This sector is an adaptation from the work of (Ishikawa et al., 2013) that highlights the 
transition of new enrollment of students in medical graduates, training to enter the 
profession, choose his/her occupation area and practice clinical and after delay either take 





Below is the figure that replicates the base concept for medical studies. 
 
Figure 7. Adapted from (Ishikawa et al., 2013)  
Also, (Huntington et al., 2012) explains that medical students in Nepal enter medical 
school after 12 years of primary and secondary school. Secondary schools are either free 
government schools, which predominate in rural areas or in urban areas among low-
income families, or they are private fee-based institutions. Medical education in Nepal is 
a 5.5 years curriculum based on the British medical education model. Upon completion 
of 2 years of pre-clinical education and 2.5 years of clinical clerkships, students receive 
a MBBS degree. Additionally, one year of internship is required to sit for the Nepal 
Medical Council licensing exam, after which the graduate is licensed to practice medicine 
in Nepal. After passing the required exam, the medical doctors obtain their license and 
can start practicing in the location of their choice. To specialize further, newly graduated 
doctors must complete postgraduate training of several years, either in Nepal or abroad. 
Based on the above literature, the medical student sector has been developed in terms of 





Figure 8. A general structure of medical students’ sector 
This sector generates the mechanism for how the medical seats are distributed to the 
students. The total number of enrolments of the medical students depends on the 
availability of medical college seats. The structure above represents the number of 
medical students recruited each year from secondary schools, determined by the seats 
allotted by Department of Health. The sufficient number of doctors are generated with 
the FRACTIONAL INCREASE IN THE MEDICAL SEATS depending on the college 
criteria and government rules. The MEDICAL COLLEGE SEATS CAPCITY is a stock 
for every year that increases with the inflow rate of FRACTIONAL INCREASE IN 
SEATS. As our model is mainly focused on the uneven distribution of doctors in rural 
and urban settings, it becomes important to distinguish in the beginning itself, the 
background of the students from their enrolment as RURAL STUDENTS and URBAN 
STUDENTS based on the PERCENTAGE OF RURAL STUDENTS IN GENERAL, an 
exogenous parameter. 
As mentioned earlier, students with rural and urban backgrounds are enrolled 




























which is an inflow to the stock of MBBS STUDENTS. During that year, the stock can be 
depleted with some DROPOUT FRACTION. The DROP OUT FRACTION, exogenous 
parameter, is considered as 5.4 percent from the study on Bangladesh which is developing 
country like Nepal (Miah et al., 2014). In Nepal, on average student spent five and half 
years as medical student before graduating as a doctor. This delay is captured in the 
MBBS STUDY DURATION of medical school that controls the outflow from the stock 
level of MBBS STUDENTS. A typical depletion formulation is used in which the RATE 
OF GRADUATION is the ratio of MBBS MEDICAL STUDENTS to the MBBS STUDY 
DURATION. The flow of graduated students then accumulates in the pool of MEDICAL 
GRADUATES. Every year, those students who do not get seat to study the medical in 
Nepal go abroad and return after completing their studies. These students also accumulate 
in the MEDICAL GRADUATES stock. Finally, a significant number of registered 
doctors are produced as REGISTERED DOCTORS with annual NMC PASSING RATE 
from Nepal Medical Council (NMC). 
3.3.2 Medical Doctor composition structure 
This structure consists of a generic workforce configuration which is based on the skills 
classification of workers similar to the work of (Cosenz & Carmine, 2014) where the has 
been  classified as rookie., medium skilled and skilled workers in this study. For our 
purpose of study, we define skills in particular as the doctors’ experience based on the 
number of years of practice both in rural and urban location. Thus, the general doctor 
framework is distinguished as the following as depicted in Figure 9 below: 
1. ROOKIES, as doctors at their first job experience, that are fresh graduates and 
registered doctors without any work experience. They do not have skills and expertise in 
their practice; thus, they need training and know how sharing with more skilled doctors 
in order to improve their skills. 
2. SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS, includes those with some years of experience 
in the practice in any location, either rural or urban area. They offer their developed 
competencies to cure their patients. They have achieved a certain year of experience in 
their job career and are ready to provide training to rookies. Their productivity is higher 
than that of rookies but lower than that of skilled doctors. To reach to the next career level 




their skills and expertise through training and choosing the specialists study. The rookies 
require the same 2 years of practice to become semi experienced doctor. 
3. EXPERIENCED DOCTORS, as ‘veteran’ doctors have developed relevant and wide 
competencies in the practice and study: this means that their expertise is the highest of 
the entire doctor’s workforce. As experience doctors, they are also responsible to provide 
training to rookies. 
 
Figure 9. A general structure of medical doctor composition 
As it has been already mentioned, different years of experience correspond to each 
doctors’ category. In this way, give the number of years of experience, it is possible to 
determine the category of doctors under which they fall. A simplifying assumption is that 
doctors are always hired at the rookie’s level and always retire from the experienced level. 
Since, there lacks number of doctors in rural therefore we have only tried to model the 
hiring process for RURAL VACANCY POSITIONS. 
In this model, rookies are the NEWLY PLACED SCHOLARSHIP DOCTORS and 
DOCTORS THROUGH VACANCY in case of rural setting and it is clearly mentioned 
that ROOKIE DOCTORS IN URBAN for the urban. After getting the license to practice, 























































































































in the rural area as agreed and stated in the Scholarship rule for a period of 2 year. The 
time to get placed and settled there requires a time of at least 1.5 year which is captured 
by the delay in the model.  The RESERVATION QUOTA SEATS (scholarship scheme) 
go to the pool of NEWLY PLACED SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS IN RURAL. Here, 
the students from either rural or urban background fall in this pool.  After two year of 
compulsory public service in rural, they get into the stock of SEMI-EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN RURAL. The doctors other than RESERVATION QUOTA SEATS and 
those who accepts the vacancy for rural location i.e. the stock of DOCTORS IN RURAL 
THROUGH VACANCY are likely to get employed in the urban area  
The SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL also include the doctors through the 
vacancy posts. After rural service acceptance, the remaining vacancy positions are 
sanctioned and filled by the doctors. Generally, the vacancy announcement is done by 
MOHP and the Public Service Commission (PSC)5 Nepal, this body advertise the 
required number of vacancy posts for doctors for different location and later distributes 
the filled vacancy posts to those respective location. In this model, it is assumed that the 
doctors through vacancy in rural setting requires MINIMUM RURAL SERVICE TIME 
OF 2 years of stay to be qualified as SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL. 
The RURAL VACANCY FULFILMENT RATE is affected by the VACANCY 
FULFILLED and the HIRING TIME. The delay created due to the long processing time 
is captured in the model. The process of vacancy for rural positions is shown in the Figure 
10. 
Thus, after gaining two years of experience, the stock of SEMI-EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN RURAL either continue to work in rural and gain years of experience or 
they move to the urban setting. The decision of movement or continue to stay is affected 
by the various factors as mentioned in the literature above. The important factors decision 
variable for the SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS’ LEAVING (movement or 
relocation) is the learning opportunities in terms of guidance, supervision and mentoring 
to continuing education (professional courses and workshops) from the senior 
experienced doctors. The income and work pressure & job satisfaction are the key factor 







are assigned for effects of learning, income and work pressure & job satisfaction job 
satisfaction which is shown through the effects sector below in more detail. After the 
migration decision of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL, they accumulate 
in the pool of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN. Those who continue to 
work for 10 years of experience in rural becomes experienced doctors. The 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL are also likely to migrate or leave the job in 
rural to relocate themselves in urban. The most important factor in consideration for such 
pool of doctors are the financial benefits and incentives. The extra income through dual 
practice has been stated in various paper. More the income earning opportunities, more 
the movement of experienced doctors to that location. Therefore, the decision of 
movement or migration of doctors rural to urban or urban to rural area are represented 
through the bi-flows concept in the model structure. The SEMI-EXPERIENCED and 
EXPERIENCED URBAN DOCTORS’ stock gets depleted by the EMIGRATION RATE 
and RETIREMENT RATE. 
3.3.3 Vacancy for rural positions 
Every year there is a vacancy opening for medical officers by MOHP through PSC. The 
vacancy positions are mainly sanctioned for remote and rural positions. Every year new 
posts are created and sanctioned with certain RATE OF INCREASE IN VACANCY. The 
RATE OF INCREASE IN VACANCY, accumulates the stock of vacancy positions for 
rural placement every year. These opening of total VACANCY posts are fulfilled with 
certain VACANCY OCCUPANCY RATE as depicted in the Figure 10. 
Later, the VACANCY FULFILLED affects the REMANINING VACANT POSITIONS 





Figure 10. A general structure of vacancy of rural positions 
3.3.4 The Learning effects 
The relative learning effect on the initial migration fraction represents how differences 
between the learning in rural and urban (learning gap) affect decisions to migrate for 
doctors which is exhibit in Figure 11. A wider experienced staffing gap between the rural 
vs. urban increases the probability to migrate. According to (Pilon & Herweg, 2001); one 
of the factors that affect the ability to learn is the shortage of people or staffing gap. When 
new pool of rookie doctors are recruited or placed, new staff directly from medical school 
cannot contribute as much as the semi- experienced or experienced doctors. It takes on 
average two year to become fully semi-skilled and ten years to become experienced 
doctors both in case of urban and rural setting. During that period the semi-experienced 
doctors is scheduled in the same way as other experienced doctors. The lack of assistance, 
supervision and mentoring with work is affected by the presence of experienced doctors. 
More experienced doctor means more guidance and sharing in the work pressure, and 
thus more learning opportunities in workplace and vice versa. Thus, the fraction of semi-
experienced to experienced rural doctor gives the measurement of learning and also same 














Figure 11. A general structure of learning effect 
Figure 11. illustrates the learning process. The improvement in hiring and retention of 
experienced doctor in rural increases the chances for the semi-skilled doctors to continue 
to practice and serve the public in rural and thus reduces the learning gap which in turn 
lowers the propensity to migrate. As the gap narrows the migration outflow from the stock 
of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL to SEMI-EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN URBAN decreases for the reason of lack of learning opportunities.  
For the LEARNING OPPORTUNTIES in rural area, more DOCTORS IN RURAL 
THROUGH VACANCY and NEWLY PLACED SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS IN 
RURAL accumulates in semi experienced and further experienced doctors’ stock in rural. 
In order to measure the learning in rural area, the ratios of RATIO OF SEMI-
EXPERIENCED TO EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL is compared. If the ratio 
is greater than 1, the SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL have less learning 
opportunities and tends to migrate from rural to urban and if the ratio of learning is lesser 
than 1, the SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL have more satisfactory 
learning opportunities and tend to stay in rural. 
For the LEARNING OPPORTUNTIES in urban area, more semi experienced and 
experienced urban doctor would have no fear to accept the available job vacancies for the 
in urban and increasing the unbalance for the distribution. The RATIO OF SEMI-
EXPERIENCED TO EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN is greater than 1, the 






















tends to migrate abroad or in rural and if the ratio of learning is lesser than 1, the SEMI-
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN have more satisfactory learning opportunities 
and tend to stay in urban. The relative learning effect for both rural and urban is modelled 
as a function of the learning ratio: 
Relative learning effects = f (learning ratio of rural vs. urban) 
The learning ratio (gap) is ratio of SEMI-EXPERIENCED TO EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN RURAL and ratio of SEMI-EXPERIENCED to EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN URBAN it is to be noted that there will always exists a gap between the 
number of semi-experienced  and experienced doctors in rural and urban (minimum gap) 
representing no change in migration decisions. In other words, doctors from rural will not 
migrate until a significant learning difference exists. This study assumes that the learning 
gap narrows as the semi experienced and experienced rural doctor to semi experienced 
and experienced urban doctor ratio approaches the value of 1. A detailed method for the 
relationship estimations is included in Appendix A. 
Relative learning opportunities is an important aspect for the semi-experienced doctors 
in both rural and urban. As learning ratio increase, willingness to migrate also rises. As 
the gap narrows, the willingness to migrate will decrease. 
3.3.5 Additional Income and Salary (Dual Practice) 
This sector presents the dynamics of additional salary and income of doctors through the 
dual practice in various hospitals and clinics. (Kiwanuka et al., 2011) defined dual 
practise as the holding of more than one job directly related to treating patients both in 
public and private within the health facility and outside it. The dual practice is triggered 
by the inadequate salary mostly in public health sector. In developing countries like 
Nepal, the tuition fees at medical school is very high in Nepal, so many students who 
were self-financed would like to get more return from their investments that influences 
their career choice location and those students after graduation is more likely to stay in 
urban area and earn more as stated in (P Ravi Shankar, 2010) work. 
Generally, the public government hospitals are located in both urban and rural areas and 




overcrowded due to either charge a nominal fee or are free of charge to the citizens of the 
country, leading to high work pressure and shortages of medical doctors especially in 
rural location. 
It is assumed that the citizens generally go to public hospitals to seek treatments and 
doctor consult the patients whether to walk-out or be admitted to the hospital for certain 
illnesses. These hospitals work at its full capacity (PUBLIC HOSPITAL CAPACITY) 
and if there is flow of patient beyond their capacity then only patients go to the private 
hospitals as shown in the structure below. Figure 12. depicts in detail how the mechanisms 






Figure 12. A general structure of additional income and salary (dual practice) 
Here, the number of SICK PEOPLE IN URBAN is determined by the FRACTION OF 
URBAN POPULATION GETTING SICK out of TOTAL URBAN POPULATION. 
Thus, the number of PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN URBAN increases by the 
RATE OF INCOMING PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN URBAN and decrease 
by the RATE OF OUTGOING PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN URBAN. The 
private hospitals and clinics in urban receive the patients only when the public hospitals 
are operated at their full capacity. Therefore, the variable ‘‘PATIENTS AT PRIVATE 






















































population determined through remaining patients from the public hospitals. The RATE 
OF INCOMING PATIENTS AT PRIVATE HOSPITALS IN URBAN and the RATE OF 
OUTGOING PATIENTS AT PRIVATE HOSPITALS IN URBAN is same as the 
structure for PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN URBAN. Since there is a high 
tendency of urban doctors to engage in dual practice, the presence of urban concentrated 
private hospitals and clinics eases to earn the additional income to their basic salary. The 
AVERAGE EXPENSES PER PATIENTS and the total number of PATIENTS AT 
PRIVATE HOSPITALS AND CLINICS IN URBAN gives the INCOME FROM THE 
PRIVATE CONSULTING. The doctor EXPECTED ADDITIONAL INCOME comes 
from the agreed share per consultation fee (DOCTORS SHARE ON INCOME OF 
PRIVATE HOSPITALS). Thus, the TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME OF URBAN 
DOCTORS is the sum of INCOME FROM THE PRIVATE CONSULTING and 
AVERAGE NORMAL ANNUAL INCOME. The RATIO OF RURAL INCOME TO 
URBAN INCOME is calculated to analyse the relative INCOME EFFECTS ON 
MIGRATION. If the RATIO OF RURAL INCOME TO URBAN INCOME is less than 
1, the SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
IN RURAL migrate from rural to urban location and if the ratio is greater than 1, the 
SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN 
RURAL would continue to work in rural whereas SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
IN URBAN and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN migrate from urban to rural 
location. 
3.3.5.1 The income effects on migration 
The relative income effect on the initial rate of experienced doctor leaving represents how 
differences between the average income in rural and urban (income gap) affect decisions 
to migrate. A wider income gap between the two locations increases the propensity to 
migrate thereby raising the NORMAL LEAVING RATE OF DOCTORS with rural 
background and urban background. Consequently, migration inflow rises adding more 
urban migrants. The improvement in the rural income level relative to the urban income 
level reduces the income gap which in turn lowers the propensity to migrate. Therefore, 
the normal leaving rate falls down reducing the migration inflow which adds less to 




inflow slows and stops for income reasons. The relative income effect is modelled as a 
function of the ratio of rural income to urban income: 
Relative income effects = f(ratio of rural income to urban income). 
The income ratio (gap) is a division of AVERAGE NORMAL RURAL INCOME relative 
to AVERAGE NORMAL URBAN INCOME in a year base (Income Ratio = average 
normal rural income / average normal urban income). It is noted that there is always a 
minimum income gap between these locations (rural vs. urban). In other words, that 
doctors will not migrate until a significant income difference exists. In this structure it is 
assumed that the income gap narrows as the ratio of rural to urban income approaches the 
value of 1. A detailed method for the effects of income in migration is included in 
Appendix A. 
The Relative income effects is an important decision factor for potential experienced 
doctors to migrate from rural to urban. As income differences increase, willingness to 
migrate also rises. As the gap narrows, the willingness or decision to migrate will 
decrease. 
3.3.6 Work Pressure and Job Satisfaction 
Figure 13. demonstrates the work pressure of rural doctors relative to work pressure stress 
of urban doctors and its effect on the job satisfaction. These pressure are measured in 
terms of the RATIO OF ACTUAL TO STANDARD PATIENTS and RATIO OF 
ACTUAL INCOME TO STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENT treated both in  rural 





Figure 13.  A general structure of Work Pressure and job satisfaction 
As already mentioned earlier, there are only government hospitals in rural area and these 
hospitals are also often overcrowded because these hospitals are cheaper and within the 
reach of poor people due to free of charge or a nominal fee. Thus, it leads to high workload 
among the doctors in rural. Here, the number of SICK PEOPLE IN RURAL is determined 
by the FRACTION OF RURAL POPULATION GETTING SICK out of TOTAL 
RURAL POPULATION. Thus, the number of PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN 
RURAL increases by the RATE OF INCOMING PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS 
IN RURAL and DECREASE BY THE RATE OF OUTGOING PATIENTS AT PUBLIC 
HOSPITALS IN RURAL. The ACTUAL PATIENTS TREATED IN RURAL is the total 
number of patients treated by the TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL. Here, the actual is 
compared to standard patients in order to represents the relative work pressure. If the 
RATIO OF ACTUAL TO STANDRAD PATIENTS IN RURAL is greater than 1, the 






















































































in terms of number of patients. Similarly, RATIO OF ACTUAL INCOME TO 
STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENT IN RURAL represents the number of patients 
treated in terms of per rupee income relative to the STANDARD INCOME PER 
PATIENTS to measure the Work Pressure in terms of monetary units. The different 
weight has been assigned for WEIGHT OF WORK PRESSURE ON JOB 
SATISFACTION and WEIGHT OF INCOME ON JOB SATISFACTION. Later the 
EFFECT OF WORK PRESSURE IN TERMS INCOME PER PATIENTS ON JOB 
SATISFACTION IN RURAL is obtained in terms of graphical function. As we know 
greater the work pressure lowers the job satisfaction and vice versa. If the RATIO OF 
ACTUAL INCOME TO STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENT IN RURAL  is lower 
than 1, there is more work pressure meaning the doctors get less amount of money treating 
more number of patient, which results to decline in job satisfaction and if the RATIO OF 
ACTUAL INCOME TO STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENT IN RURAL is greater 
than 1, there is less workload meaning the doctors get more amount of money treating 
less number of patient, which results to increase in job satisfaction in rural location. 
Both the EFFECT OF WORKPRESSURE in terms of number of patients treated and 
INCOME PER PATIENTS ON JOB SATISFACTION is calculated to analyse the 
ACTUAL JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL. The ACTUAL JOB SATISFACTION IN 
RURAL is the product of NORMAL JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL, EFFECT OF 
WORK PRESSURE IN TERMS OF INCOME PER PATIENTS ON JOB 
SATISFACTION IN RURAL and EFFECT OF WORK PRESSURE ON JOB 
SATISFACTION IN RURAL. 
More public hospitals and private hospitals & clinics are concentrated in cities and urban 
area with better infrastructure and facilities. The public hospitals are better equipped. The 
patients are over flooded in both public and private hospitals and clinics. So, the number 
of total patients treated are the sum of PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN URBAN 
and PATIENTS AT PRIVATE HOSPITLAS & CLINICS IN URBAN. More detailed 
explanation for this section is presented in the ADDITIONAL INCOME AND SALARY 
(DUAL PRCATIVCE) sector. The ACTUAL PATIENTS TREATED IN URBAN is the 
total number of patients treated in both PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HOSPITALS & 
CLINICS by the TOTAL DOCTORS IN URBAN. Here, the actual is compared to 




ACTUAL TO STANDRAD PATIENTS IN URBAN is greater than 1, the doctor has a 
greater work pressure but if it is less than 1, there is no pressure at all in urban in terms 
of number of patients. Similarly, RATIO OF ACTUAL INCOME TO STANDARD 
INCOME PER PATIENT IN URBAN represents the number of patients treated in terms 
of per rupee income relative to the STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENTS to measure 
the Work Pressure in terms of monetary units. Later the EFFECT OF WORK PRESSURE 
IN TERMS INCOME PER PATIENTS ON JOB SATISFACTION IN URBAN is 
obtained. As we know greater the work pressure lowers the job satisfaction and vice versa. 
If the RATIO OF ACTUAL INCOME TO STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENT IN 
URBAN  is lesser than 1, there is more work pressure meaning the doctors get the less 
amount of money treating more number of patient, which results to decline in job 
satisfaction and if the If the RATIO OF ACTUAL INCOME TO STANDARD INCOME 
PER PATIENT IN URBAN is greater than 1, there is less workload meaning the doctors 
get the more amount of money treating less number of patient, which results to increase 
in job satisfaction in urban location. 
The relative job satisfaction due to workload pressure between rural and urban area is the 
ratio between ACTUAL JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL and ACTUAL JOB 
SATISFACTION IN URBAN. It takes some time for building and adjusting the 
perceptions on job satisfaction and its ratio. The adjustment process will take place over 
a time delay defined as perception time of 3 years. It is the smoothed value of the 
incremental accumulation of perceived ratio of job satisfaction. This perceived ratio has 
an effect on the migration decisions. If the ACTUAL JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL 
and ACTUAL JOB SATISFACTION IN URBAN is lower than 1, the SEMI-
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL 
migrate from rural to urban location and if the ratio is greater than 1, the SEMI-
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN 
migrate from urban to rural location. Therefore, the EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED 
DIFFERENCE OF RURAL TO URBAN JOB SATISFACTION IN MIGRATION is 
analysed and explained in detailed (Appendix A.) 
3.3.6.1 The Work Pressure & Job Satisfaction Effects on Migration 
The work pressure effect on the initial rate of semi-experienced and experienced doctor 




SATISFACTION in rural and urban affect decisions to migrate. A wider perceived job 
satisfaction gap between these two locations increases the propensity to migrate thereby 
raising the NORMAL LEAVING RATE OF DOCTORS with rural background and 
urban background. Consequently, migration inflow rises adding more urban migrants. 
The reduction in workload in the rural area increases the job satisfaction and thus result 
to lower chances to migrate to the urban. Therefore, the normal leaving rate falls down 
reducing the migration inflow which adds less to semi- experienced and experienced 
doctor in urban stock and vice-versa. As the gap narrows the migration inflow slows and 
the doctors in rural are more likely to stay in rural. The job satisfaction effect is modelled 
as a function of the RATIO OF JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL TO URBAN: 
Relative Perceived job satisfaction effects = f (ratio of actual job satisfaction in rural to 
actual job satisfaction in urban income). 
The perceived ratio of job satisfaction (gap) is a SMOOTH Function with a division of 
ACTAUL JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL relative to ACTAUL JOB 
SATISFACTION IN URBAN INCOME in a year. It is noted that there is always a 
minimum perception gap in job satisfaction between these locations (rural vs. urban). In 
other words, that doctors will not migrate until a significant job satisfaction difference 
exists. In this structure it is assumed that the job satisfaction gap narrows as the ratio of 
rural to urban job satisfaction approaches the value of 1. More detailed on the estimation 
of the limits of effects of job satisfaction on migration is explained in documentation. 
(Appendix A.) 
3.3.7 Population sector 
Since the purpose of the model is to capture the dynamics behind uneven distribution of 
doctors in rural and urban, we need to incorporate a population sector. The stock of 
RURAL POPULATION and URBAN POPULATION are associated with the inflow of 
CRUDE BIRTH RATE and outflow of the CRUDE DEATH RATE for each location. 
The movement from rural to urban are captured through RURAL TO URBAN 
MIGRATION FRACTION. Out of the stock of URBAN POPULATION people usually 





Here, the TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL are the sum of REGISTERED DOCTORS 
(rural background), NEWLY PLACED SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS IN RURAL, 
DOCTORS IN RURAL THROUGH VACANCY, SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN 
RURAL and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL. The TOTAL DOCTORS IN 
URBAN are the sum of REGISTERED DOCTORS (urban background), ROOKIE 
DOCTORS IN URBAN, SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN URBAN and 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN. Thus, RURAL DOCTOR TO RURAL 
POPULATION RATIO is the ratio between TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL and 
RURAL POPULATION. Similarly, URBAN DOCTOR TO URBAN POPULATION 
RATIO is the ratio between TOTAL DOCTORS IN URBAN and URBAN 
POPULATION. Therefor these ratios are compared to show the uneven distribution of 
doctors in Nepal. 
Various study in South Asia revealed that physician supply impacts CRUDE DEATH 
RATE. Therefore, we try to consider this relationship between the doctor supply and 
crude death rate in our structure. The sector does not contain an endogenous structure that 
would portray the feedback from the supply of doctors to crude birth rate. The study from 
(Shetty & Shetty, 2014) concluded that the doctors per capita (primary health care 
physician) had an inverse association with mortality rate (CRUDE DEATH RATE). In 
other words, the country with the best population physician ratio had the best mortality 
indices. It is argued that more emphasis should be given to primary health care and 
equitable distribution of resources. 
The data from Nepal revealed that improved health outcomes in terms of mortality rate is 
associated with physician supply and an increase of one primary care physician per 
10,000 population. This change effect is captured by using elasticity of crude death rate 
to total doctors’ supply in urban and rural location. The detailed structure is exhibit in 





Figure 14. A general structure of rural and urban population sector 
The population sector also gives the doctor per 10000 population for rural area and urban 
area separately. The TOTAL POPULATION is sum of RURAL POPULATION and 
URBAN POPULATION. The TOTAL DOCTORS are the sum of TOTAL DOCTORS 
IN RURAL AND TOTAL DOCTIRS IN URBAN. Thus, DOCTORS TO POPULATION 
RATIO (00,000) is calculated by TOTAL DOCTORS/ TOTAL POPULATION. 
3.4 Feedback Perspective  
The following CLD shows the feedback structure underlying the uneven distribution of 
doctors in Nepal (rural vs. urban). This pattern of migration behavior is the outcome of 
interactions between eleven major feedback loops that represent the combined effects of 
all the variables discussed in this chapter. Figure 15 is the detailed explanation to the 






























































































































































































































































































































R1- SEMI EXPERIENCED MIGRATION 
LOOP 
The SEMI EXPERIENCED MIGRATION 
LOOP tends to explain the reason for the 
migration of SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTOR IN RURAL and SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN URBAN to 
and from. As SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTOR IN RURAL increases RATIO OF 
SEMI EXPERIENCED TO 
EXPERIENCED RURAL DOCTOR 
increases which increases the RATE OF 
SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
LEAVING FROM RURAL. This increases 
in leaving rate increases the number of SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN 
which increases the RATIO OF SEMI 
EXPERIENCE TO EXPERIENCED 
URBAN DOCTOR consequently increasing 
RATE OF SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS LEAVING FROM URBAN. 
This increase in RATE OF SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR LEAVING 
FROM URBAN closes the loop further 
increasing the SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN RURAL. This loop is a 
vicious cycle that either increases the semi 
experienced doctor in rural or urban area 
depending on the strength of on balancing 
loop governing the learning of semi-
experienced rural and urban doctor explained 
below. 
B1- RURAL LEARNING LOOP This loop drives the strength of the R1 LOOP 




experienced doctors from rural to urban or 
vice versa. As SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTOR IN RURAL increases RATIO OF 
SEMI EXPERIENCED TO 
EXPERIENCED RURAL DOCTOR which 
increases the RATE OF SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR LEAVING 
FORM RURAL resulting to a decrease in 
SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN 
RURAL. 
R2-RURAL RETENTION LOOP This loop determines the increasing goal of 
the RURAL LEARNING LOOP. As SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN RURAL 
increases, after significant delay, 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL 
which decreases the RATIO OF SEMI 
EXPERIENCED TO EXPERIENCED 
RURAL DOCTORS which further decreases 
the RATE OF SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS LEAVING FROM RURAL 
resulting to higher SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTOR IN RURAL and further increasing 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL 
B2- URBAN LEARNING LOOP Similar to RURAL LEARNING LOOP, this 
loop drives the strength of the R1 LOOP 
which drives the movement of semi 
experienced doctors from rural to urban or 
vice versa. As SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTOR IN URBAN increases the RATIO 
OF SEMI EXPERIENCED TO 
EXPERIENCED URBAN DOCTOR which 
increases the RATE OF SEMI 




FORM URBAN resulting to a decrease in 
SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN 
URBAN. 
R3-URBAN RETENTION LOOP This loop acts in a same manner as the 
RURAL RETENTION LOOP but for the 
urban sector. This loop reinforces the 
EXPEREINCED DOCTOR IN URBAN by 
decreasing the RATIO OF SEMI 
EXPERIENCED TO EXPERIENCED 
URBAN DOCTOR and reducing the RATE 
OF SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTOR 
LEAVING FORM URBAN ultimately 
increasing the EXPEREINCED DOCTORS 
IN URBAN through higher retention of 
SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN 
URBAN.  
 
The loop discussed so far are crucial in 
determining the movement of semi 
experienced doctor between rural and urban 
area depending upon the strength gained by 
each loop due to the effect of these loops as 
well as other loops that effect the movement 
of experienced doctor to and from rural and 
urban sector. 
R4-URBAN PRIVATE INCOME LOOP One of the major determinants governing the 
migration of doctor is income.  This loop 
aims to capture the effect of income on the 
migration of both semi-experienced and 
experienced doctor from rural to urban and 
vice versa. This loop can be traced starting 
from TOTAL DOCTORS IN URBAN, 




EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN 
and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN 
URBAN. As TOTAL DOCTORS IN 
URBAN increases, FRACTIONAL URBAN 
CRUDE DEATH RATE decreases resulting 
in higher URBAN POPULATION. 
Assuming exogenous FRACTIONAL 
RURAL CRUDE BIRTH RATE and 
FRACTION OF PEOPLE GETTING SICK 
IN URBAN, ANNUAL SICK PEOPLE IN 
URBAN increases due to increase in 
URBAN POPULATION. As ANNUAL 
SICK PEOPLE IN URBAN increases 
PATIENT AT PRIVATE HOSPITAL AND 
CLINIC AT URBAN increase, under 
assumption that public hospital at urban have 
a fixed patient capacity. With the increase in 
PATIENTS AT PRIVATE HOSTPITAL 
AND CLINIC AT URBAN, INCOME 
FROM PRIVATE CONSULTING increases 
which further increases the TOTAL 
ANNUAL INCOME OF URBAN 
DOCTOR. This decreases the RATIO OF 
RURAL INCOME TO URBAN INCOME 
making urban migration favourable for 
experienced rural doctors determined by 
increase in RATE OF EXPEREINCED 
DOCTORS LEAVING RURAL. This 
increases the EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
IN URBAN and closes the reinforcing loop 





B3- URBAN PRIVATE INCOME 
CONSTRAIN LOOP 
URBAN PRIVE INCOME LOOP, discussed 
above, reinforces additional income for 
urban doctors resulting to higher migration 
of doctors from rural to urban. While, 
URBAN PRIVATE INCOME 
CONSTRAIN LOOP brings a control to the 
limitless increase in the rural to urban 
migration of doctors. This loop follows the 
same path as that of R4, but it increases the 
PATIENT AT PUBLIC HOSPITAL IN 
URBAN with the increase in ANNUAL 
SICK PEOPLE IN URBAN. 
Job satisfaction is also among one of the factors that drive the movement of doctors from 
rural to urban or vice versa. Job satisfaction for doctor, here, is affected by two ways- work 
pressure in terms of actual patients and work pressure in terms of income per patients in 
rural. These two determinants for job satisfaction are driven by the loops discussed in the 
following section. 
R5- RURAL SEMI EXPERIENCED JOB 
SATISFACTION LOOP 
This loop connects the elements that drive 
the job satisfaction of rural semi experienced 
doctors. In order to trace this, we start with 
the increases in SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTOR IN RURAL which increases 
TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL. As 
TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL increases 
ACTUAL PATIENTS TREATED PER 
DOCTOR IN RURAL decreases. Decrease 
in ACTUAL PATIENT TREATED PER 
DOCTOR IN RURAL results to higher 
INCOME PER PATIENTS IN RURAL and 
lower WORK PRESSURE IN TERMS OF 
ACTUAL PATIENTS TREATED IN 
RURAL. Higher INCOME PER DOCTOR 




ACTUAL INCOME TO STANDARD 
INCOME PER PATIENT IN RURAL, 
assuming an exogenous STANDARD 
INCOME PER PATIENT, resulting in 
decreased WORK PRESSURE IN TERMS 
OF INCOME PER PAITENTS IN RURAL. 
Lower work pressure both in terms of income 
per patients and actual patient treated 
improves ACTUAL JOB SATISFACTION 
IN RURAL and consequently improve 
PERCEIVED RATIO OF JOB 
SATISFACTION IN RURAL TO URBAN. 
Such improved perceived ratio of job 
satisfaction decreases the RATE OF SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS LEAVING 
FORM RURAL resulting to higher SEMI 
EXPERIENCED RURAL DOCTOR and 
finally closing the loop. 
R6- URBAN SEMI EXPERIENCED JOB 
SATISFACTION LOOP 
This loop follows the same casualty as that 
of for the R5 while the only difference is the 
initial variable. Here, the loop starts with the 
increase in SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN URBAN which increases 
TOTAL DOCTORS IN URBAN, then 
decreases ACTUAL PATIENTS TREATED 
PER DOCTOR IN URBAN which increases 
INCOME PER PATIENT TREATED IN 
URBAN. Increase INCOMEP PER 
PATIENT TREATED IN URBAN increases 
the RATIO OF ACTUAL INCOME TO 
STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENT IN 
URBAN. Increase in this ratio decreases 




INCOME PER PATIENTS IN URBAN, 
assuming exogenous standard income per 
patient, and increases ACTUAL JOB 
SATISFACTION IN URBAN which 
decreases PERCEIVED RATIO OF JOB 
SATISFACTION IN RURAL TO URBAN 
and further decreases the RATE OF SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR LEAVING 
FROM URBAN. Decrease in this rate closes 
the loop by increasing the SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN. 
R7-RURAL EXPERIENCED JOB 
SATISFACTION LOOP 
Similar to R5, this loop drives the job 
satisfaction of rural experienced doctors. We 
start with the increase in EXPERIENCED 
DOCTOR IN RURAL which increases 
TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL. As 
TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL increases 
ACTUAL PATIENTS TREATED PER 
DOCTOR IN RURAL decreases. Now 
following the same path as R5, i.e.  decreased 
ACTUAL PATIENT TREATED PER 
DOCTOR IN RURAL,  higher INCOME 
PER PATIENTS IN RURAL, lower WORK 
PRESSURE IN TERMS OF ACTUAL 
PATIENTS TREATED IN RURAL 
consequently higher INCOME PER 
DOCTOR IN RURAL  and higher RATIO 
OF ACTUAL INCOME TO STANDARD 
INCOME PER PATIENT IN RURAL, 
assuming an exogenous STANDARD 
INCOME PER PATIENT, resulting in 
decreased WORK PRESSURE IN TERMS 




which improves ACTUAL JOB 
SATISFACTION IN RURAL and 
consequently improve PERCEIVED RATIO 
OF JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL TO 
URBAN. Such improved perceived ratio of 
job satisfaction improve decreases the RATE 
OF EXPERIENCED DOCTORS LEAVING 
FORM RURAL resulting to higher 
EXPERIENCED RURAL DOCTOR and 
finally closing the loop. 
R8- URBAN EXPERIENCED JOB 
SATISFACTION LOOP 
This loop drives the job satisfaction of urban 
experienced doctors. We start with the 
increase in EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN 
URBAN which increases TOTAL 
DOCTORS IN URBAN. As TOTAL 
DOCTORS IN URBAN increases ACTUAL 
PATIENTS TREATED PER DOCTOR IN 
URBAN decreases. Now following the same 
path as R6, i.e.  decreased ACTUAL 
PATIENT TREATED PER DOCTOR IN 
URBAN,  higher INCOME PER PATIENTS 
IN URBAN, lower WORK PRESSURE IN 
TERMS OF ACTUAL PATIENTS 
TREATED IN URBAN consequently higher 
INCOME PER DOCTOR IN URBAN  and 
higher RATIO OF ACTUAL INCOME TO 
STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENT IN 
URBAN, assuming an exogenous 
STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENT, 
resulting in decreased WORK PRESSURE 
IN TERMS OF INCOME PER PAITENTS 
IN URBAN which improves ACTUAL JOB 




consequently improve PERCEIVED RATIO 
OF JOB SATISFACTION IN URBAN TO 
RURAL. Such improved perceived ratio of 
job satisfaction improve decreases the RATE 
OF EXPERIENCED DOCTORS LEAVING 
FORM URBAN resulting to higher 
EXPERIENCED URBAN DOCTOR and 
finally closing the loop. 
B4/R9-POPULATION MIGRATION 
LOOP 
This loop either reinforces or balances the 
migration of RURAL POPULATION to 
URBAN POPULATION. As a minor 
balancing loop in itself it can be followed as: 
with the increases in RURAL 
POPULATION, RURAL TO URBAN 
NATURAL MIGRATION RATE increases, 
for the exogenous NET RURAL TO 
URBAN MIGRATION FRACTION.  This 
loop then interacts with other reinforcing 
loops, mainly, R5, R6, R7 and R8 and 
depending on the strength of these loop 
increases RURAL POPULATION or 
decreases RURAL POPULATION. Thus, 
the loop changes its nature based on the 
strength of other loops which grounds the 
effects of all other loops described above in 
determining the problematic behavior. 





Chapter 4: Validation 
4.1 Model Validation 
The concept of model validation in System Dynamics is controversial: there is no formally 
accepted list of tests an SD model has to pass to be considered validated(Sterman, 2000) 
According to Forrester, the core core principles of SD model validation are structure, behavior 
and policy sensitivity tests. According to (Barlas, 1996) the primary reason for checking 
validity of any model is to build the soundness of the model with respect to its purpose. The 
validation process builds the confidence in the model.  
In order to validate any model, Barlas suggested a logical sequence as a guideline for carrying 
out model validity tests in three stages:  
• Direct structural tests,  
• Structure-oriented behavior tests, and  
• Behavior tests. 
Based on formal procedures outlined by (Barlas, 1996) the study conducts the model validity 
tests and the following is a brief explanation of the validation results.  
4.2 Direct Structural Validity Tests 
The major task has been constructing a model by mapping how the real system works that 
replicates historical medical doctors’ internal migration patterns of behavior based on 
literatures and authentic data sources. So, for this study, direct structure tests are conducted by 
comparing each equation and logical function in the model based on the available theoretical 
or empirical knowledge about the aspect of the system being modelled and excludes any kind 
of simulations as stated by (Barlas, 1996). There are three direct structure tests for the model’s 
validation based on empirical test: a structure confirmation test, a parameter confirmation test, 




 Structure confirmation test 
Structure confirmation for this research began with the conceptualization of mental model 
based on intensive literature review of articles, reports, journals from various national, 
international scholars and views of related filed expert has been included.  All the reviewed 
literatures articles for this research purpose had already been presented in detail in Chapter 2 
and the transformation of Theoretical frameworks outlined in the literature were extensively 
used and presented in the model’s structure has been done in Chapter 2. Since, model building 
is an iterative process, the model structure has been adjusted or changed during testing.  
For example, while modelling the SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTORS LEAVING RATE for 
both rural doctors and urban doctors, only LEARNING EFFECTS and WORK PRESSURE & 
JOB SATISFACTION EFFECTS were stated to be important factors for the doctors’ decision 
whether to migrate or stay in rural or urban area. However, later with extensive review and 
model discussion with medical doctors, it was identified that SALARY AND INCOME also 
plays a major role for doctors’ movement. So, ADDITIONAL INCOME AND SALARY 
EFFECTS has also been modelled for SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS LEAVING RATE. 
Parameter Confirmation Test 
Based on the real-world data, the initialization of stocks and parameters value were done. The 
various reliable government publications, reports, international organization data were 
extracted for this test purpose. The estimated parameters specially, MAXIMUM JOB 
SATISFACTION, the graph function was all estimated using literature review on various 
journals and research paper. The DELAY TIME, VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT TIME, 
ASSESSEMENT TIME, PLACEMENT DELAY etc. are the terminologies used in real 
practice.  More details about all the parameters are presented with relevant data sources in 
documentation to the model in Appendix A. 
Direct extreme-condition Test 
In this test, the validity of model equations under extreme conditions is evaluated, by assessing 
the credibility of the resulting values against the knowledge/anticipation of what would happen 
under a similar circumstance in realistic  (Barlas, 1996) This test can be explained with an 




rural students and urban students.  This parameter is an important variable for determining 






This formulation explains that in reality the number of fresh doctors who are willing to practice 
in urban area can never be negative. Thus, MAX function is used to regulate the value of 
AVAILABLE REGISTERED DOCTORS FOR URBAN. This means the AVAILABLE 
REGISTERED DOCTORS FOR URBAN is either maximum value of zero or the remaining 
REGISTERED DOCTORS after RATE OF RURAL SERVICE ACCEPTANCE which is 
allotted through the scholarship scheme (RESERVATION QUOTA SEATS) for compulsory 
2 years bonding rural service and RURAL VACANCY FULFILLMENT RATE for rural 
vacancy. 
Dimensional Consistency Test 
The dimensional consistency test assesses whether the equations are dimensionally consistent 
within the model without using any “dummy” parameters that do not exist in the real system  
(Barlas, 1996)&(Sterman, 2000). The isee system’ Stella Architect software where the SD 
model has been developed is used for this dimensional test. This software has built in function 
for unit consistency check. The software automatically checked when the model was run and 
confirmed that all the units within the model were correct and consistent with no any unit error. 
Figure 16 has no any error notification which is usually on the lower most right-hand corner of 





Figure 16. Unit Consistency test 
4.3 Structure-Oriented Behavior Test 
Structure-oriented behavior validation requires simulations, evaluating the validity of the 
model’s structure indirectly, and is conducted by applying certain behavior tests to the behavior 
patterns generated by the model ((Barlas, 1996);(Forrester & Senge, 1980). These tests have 
been conducted with an assumption that all other variables except those under consideration 
are held constant (ceteris paribus).  
The following structure-oriented behavior tests were selected in accordance with the purpose 
of the model in this research: the extreme- condition test and the behavior-sensitivity test.  
Extreme condition test 
The extreme-condition test tests the robustness of the model under extreme conditions of the 
parameters.(Sterman, 2000) demonstrates that model should behave in realistic fashion no 
matter what extreme values are set, how extreme the input or policies imposed on it be. It is 
conducted by assigning extreme values to selected parameters and comparing the model 
generated behavior of the real system under the extreme condition (Barlas, 1996) . For 




do so in modelled systems. Another way to test the model in the extreme-conditions test is to 
initiate the stocks with extreme values.  
So, for our modelling purpose, extreme condition test was performed for various parameters. 
For example, RESERVATION QUOTA FRACTION is an exogenous here which is important 
for determining the NEWLY PLACED SCHOLARSHIP STUDENT IN RURAL, the lower 
rate mean decrease in RATE OF RURAL SERVICE ACCEPTANCE and NEWLY PLACED 
SCHOLARSHIP STUDENT IN RURAL which in turn increases the rural doctor ratio. 
Extreme condition test ideally means changing the parameter value to both lowest and higher 
values. However, in case of VACANCY OCCUPANCY RATE which is an important 
exogenous variable which is used for determining the DOCTORS IN RURAL THROUGH 
VACANCY, lower rate mean decrease in VACANCY FULFILLED and DOCTORS IN 
RURAL THROUGH VACANCY. When we change the parameter value lowest and highest, 
the MIN function regulates the flow RURAL VACANCY FULFILLMENT RATE. Figure 17. 
explains when the VACANCY OCCUPANY RATE is set to zero, the stock of DOCTORS IN 
RURAL THROUGH VACANCY does not below zero and when vacancy is set to be 100 
percent, it rises the stock of DOCTORS IN RURAL THROUGH VACANCY. 
 
































Behaviour Sensitivity Test 
The sensitivity analysis provided an evaluation of the impact of each factor. The aim of 
sensitivity analysis is to generate and compare behaviour pattern by changing the model 
parameters and assess the validity and reliability of the given model. In order to analyze 
parameter sensitivity, the sensitive parameters are identified and restricted to a reasonable 
range, to observe responses to variations in the model. (Yu et al., 2015). After the change in 
the sensitivity parameters, the outcome has showed changes in magnitude with different degree 
of sensitivity ranked either very sensitive, little sensitivity or no sensitivity but the patterns of 
behavior remain the same. Similarly, the graph function sensitivity tests were conducted by 
changing the shape and the slope of the graph. 
For this modelling purpose various parameters were tested for sensitivity by using sensitivity 
features of stella. The following are the identified key sensitive parameters in the model: 
• RESERVATION QUOTA SEATS is an exogenous variable that increase in reservation 
quota did increase the rural doctor ratio but such increase in rural doctor ratio decreases 
the urban doctor ratio. 
Parameter  High value Base run value Low 
value  
Tested variable  
RESERVATION 
QUOTA SEATS   
0.30 0.136 0  TOTAL DOCTORS IN 
RURAL, TOTAL 
DOCTORS IN URBAN 
Table 3. Parameter values of RESERVATION QUOTA SEATS for sensitivity test 
Figure 18. below demonstrate the TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL and TOTAL DOCTORS 
IN URBAN are both sensitive to the change in parameter value of reservation quota seats. 
Higher fraction of scholarship seats would result in higher NEWLY PLACED 
SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS IN RURAL placement and consequently higher SEMI-
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL resulting in higher TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL 
ratio and lower TOTAL DOCTORS IN URBAN. There is lower number of TOTAL 




for compulsory rural bonding service, more doctors to practice medicine in rural, thus less 
TOTAL DOCTORS available for urban area. 
 
 
Figure 18. Sensitivity test: RESERVATION QUOTA SEATS 
• FRACTIONAL INCREASE IN RURAL VACANCY is also another exogenous 
variable that increase in rural vacancy increases the rural doctors’ population but 
decreases the urban doctors’ population. 
Parameter  High value Base run value Low 
value  





0.10 0.034 0  TOTAL DOCTORS IN 
RURAL, TOTAL 
DOCTORS IN URBAN 


















































Figure 19. Sensitivity test: FRACTIONAL INCREASE IN RURAL VACANCY 
From Figure 19. the TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL and TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL are 
changed with the change in estimated fractional increase in rural vacancy. When estimated 
fraction of rural vacancy is increased, the doctors’ in rural through vacancy also increased due 
to availability of more vacancy placement only for rural positions. Increase in FRACTIONAL 
INCREASE IN RURAL VACANCY increased TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL which 
increases the stock of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL which in turn increases 
the stock of TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL and decreases the TOTAL DOCTORS IN 
URBAN. The TOTAL DOCTORS IN URBAN IS DECREASED because the PLACEMENT 
OF FRESH PASS OUT IN URBAN AREA is the inflow to the ROOKIE DOCTORS which 
are the doctors available after their placement in rural through scholarship or rural vacancy 
positions. 
Partial model testing 
Partial model testing was conducted when analyzing the simulation runs while developing each 
sector. The modeler installed the effect switch for the decision variable for learning, work 
pressure and job satisfaction to check the effect of those variable to produce the desired 
behavior of reference mode.  The behavior of each stock produced are compared with the 
historical data. Thus, each sector functioning as intended is confirmed through partial model 
testing. 
 
4.4 Behavior Validity Test 
After the model structure validity test, the other important and final validation step is to confirm 




















































According to (Barlas, 1996) it is most important to reproduce the patterns (trends, phases, 
frequencies, etc.) than to implement point- by-point prediction. The model generates and 
replicates the historical behavior of the real medical doctors’ migrant stock in rural and Urban 
area of Nepal with some degree of accuracy both qualitatively and quantitatively together with 
historical behavior of other important variables.  
The Figure 20. shows the simulated results compared to the results in the reference mode. The 
solid line represents real behavior from the data and dotted line represents model generated 
behavior. The comparison has been made of four variables namely DOCTORS TO 
POPULATION RATIO, RURAL DOCTOTRS TO RURAL POPULATION RATIO, URBAN 
DOCTORS TO URBAN POPULATION RATIO and POPULATION (in total, rural and 
urban). The model tends to replicate the behavior pattern which is close to real data trajectory   
however, the behavior of RURAL DOCTOR TO RURAL POPULATION undershoots actual 
data at the later time horizon whereas the behavior for URBAN DOCTOR TO URBAN 
POPULATION OVERSHOOTS in between the years and later it undershoots. It is mainly due 
to the assumptions made in 3.2. Moreover, other reason might be due to the delays in hiring, 
assessment, placement time which were calibrated in order to obtain the reference mode of 
behavior. These delays depend solely on the internal settings of the concerned government 
authority. In summary, the real behavior pattern of the period was closely reproduced by the 
model simulation, it can be claimed at this point that the model has passed the behavior-pattern 






Figure 20. Behavior pattern test 
Therefore, it can be concluded that after various tests on the model, the model is robust. The 
validation from the direct structure test and structure oriented behavior declares the structure 
of the model with the logic behind model generated behavior. The behavior pattern test are 
mainly confirmed by the model generated behavior produced by real data. The sensitivity 
analysis tests explained the important sensitive parameter that reveals the acceptable degree of 



































Chapter 5: Model Behavior 
The previous chapter presented explanation to the model verification and validation. This 
chapter presents the simulation results of the developed model with confidence gathered from 
validated model. The behavior produced by model structure is classified as Ideal run and Base 
run which are explained in detail below: 
5.1 Ideal Run 
The ideal run exhibits the behavior under situation where the effect of learning, income and 
job satisfaction are not considered. In other words, it iterates the ideal situation assuming that 
doctor assigned to the rural area or urban areas stayed in their respective region without 
competing with their counter parts in another sector and without migrating. This situation is a 
hypothetical situation which is less likely to happen in reality.  
In order to simulate the Ideal Run, the EFFECT SWITCH is made ineffective by assigning the 
value zero. When the effect switch is off, there is no interaction among the major reinforcing 
and balancing loop except the POPULATION MIGRATION LOOP. When these loops are 
inactive both URBAN DOCTOR TO URBAN POPULATION RATIO and RURAL DOCTOR 
TO RURAL POPULATION RATIO is improving as shown in Figure 21. 
 





















Figure 21. demonstrates the dynamics of the system where the feedback loops described in the 
previous section are inactive, Ideal Run. In order to trace this behavior we look into the two 
major component that produces this behavior in Figure 22. 
  
Figure 22.Ideal Run: TOTAL DOCTORS and POPULATION 
Figure 22 justifies that increase in the doctor to population ratio in both urban and rural area 
shown in Figure 21. Although, the population in both rural and urban area has been increasing 
the ratio has been improving due the gradual increase in the TOTAL DOCTOR in both rural 
and urban area. A gradual increase of doctors in both urban and rural area is due to 
consideration that effect of learning, income and job satisfaction is zero and doctors do not 
migrate. Further, the increase in total doctors can be traced back to the increase in semi 
experienced and experienced doctors in these sectors shown in Figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23. Ideal Run: TOTAL EXPERIENCED AND SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
 
The increase of total doctor in rural and urban area, under Ideal run, is due the increase in both 




















































traced back to the increases in REGISTERED DOCTORS after MEDICAL GRADUATES 
pass medical council examination. Such REGISTERED DOCTORS move along the aging 
chain to become SEMI-EXPEREINCED and EXPEREINCED DOCTORS for different area 
(urban or rural). However, it can be noted that the rate of increase in the doctors in urban area 
is slower than that of the rural which is mainly triggered due to the out migration of both semi-
experienced and experienced doctors from rural and urban area driven by exogenous 
FRACTION OF URBAN DOCTOR MIGRATING ABROAD. 
5.2 Base Run 
Base run is to be considered as the actual representation of the existing situation of migration 
of the doctors from rural to urban. Base run is simulated by activating the effect switch, i.e., 
assigning value one to the EFFECT SWITCH. With this EFFECT SWITCH active, all the 
major loops, dormant during Ideal run, are activated resulting in interesting dynamics that 
caused the problematic behavior. 
As shown in the ideal run, we start with the same key variable and trace back the effect of now 
active loops- learning loops (B1and B2), income loops (B3 and R4), retention loops (R2 and 
R3) and job satisfaction loops (R5, R6, R7 and R8). Figure 24 shows the behavior of key 
variable under explanation. 
 
Figure 24. Base Run: TOTAL EXPERIENCED AND SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
As seen in above figure, similar to the Ideal run both URBAN DOCTOR TO URBAN 
POPULATION RATIO and RURAL DOCTOR TO RURAL POPULATION RATIO is 





















terms of the numerical ratio, ratio of urban doctor to urban population has increased while ratio 
of rural doctor to rural population has decreased. Such difference in value is caused to the 
migration of doctor from rural to urban. Such migration of doctors is observed while analysing 
the sources of this behavior. Figure 25 depicts the behavior of sources that results in the 
behavior shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 25. Base Run: TOTAL EXPERIENCED AND SEMI EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
Similar to the Ideal Run, the behavior of these TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL and TOTAL 
DOCTORS IN URBAN show as gradual increase in the number of doctors but the actual 
number value are significantly different. Likewise, the growth trend shown by the RURAL 
POPULATION and URBAN POPUALTION also similar. Figure 26 represents the breakdown 
of total doctor which is necessary to trace the effect of different loop and their impact on the 
rate of migration of doctors from rural to urban or vice versa. 
 
 





















































Figure 26 exhibit the underlying cause of the problematic behaivor. The behavioral trends of 
over variables demonstrated in Figure 24 and 25 are similar to Ideal run, notably they differed 
in value. Similarly, Figure 26 also demonstrates a similar trend with the Ideal run. However, 
Figure 26 differs from Figure 23 noticeable in two ways: the gap between TOTAL SEMI 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL and URBAN has widened and the TOTAL 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN is higher in Base run. 
Both these runs were performed with same initial values, thus total semi-experienced and 
experienced doctors in both rural and urban area were same. However, as urban doctors ahv 
the opportunity to earn additional income from private practice R4-URBAN PRIVATE 
INCOME LOOP is activated. R4 LOOP decreases PERCEIVED RATIO OF SATISFACTION 
IN RURUAL TO URBAN, as other loops are relative less dominant, which increases RATE 
OF EXPERIENCED DOCTORS LEAVING RURAL and decreases RATE OF 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS LEAVING URBAN. Due to this active R4 LOOP, 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN increases as first. PERCIEVED RATIO OF JOB 
SATISFACTION IN RURAL TO URBAN also effects migration of semi-experienced doctor; 
however, this effect is not very signification for semi-experienced doctor because of the lower 
WEIGHT OF JOB SATISFACTION, an exogenous input, assigned for semi-experienced 
doctors. 
As EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN increases RATIO OF SEMI EXPERIENCED 
TO EXPERIENCED URBAN DOCTOR decreases and RATE OF SEMI EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS LEAVING FROM URBAN decreases. With experienced doctors increasing in 
urban the goal of the B2 balancing loop becomes higher than B1 strengthening R1 loop in favor 
of migration of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN RURAL to SEMI-EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN URBAN.  
R1 and R4 loop moves doctors, both semi-experienced and experienced, for rural to urban. As 
a result, TOTAL DOCTOR IN RURAL decreases while RURAL POPULATION keeps on 
increasing mainly due to exogenous FRACTIONAL RURAL CRUDE BIRTH RATE. Increase 
in RURAL POPULATION and decrease in SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN RURAL and 
URBAN depletes the strength of R5 and R7 resulting in further strengthening of R6 and R8 
LOOP which widens gap between semi-experience rural and urban doctors and increases the 
number of urban experienced doctors as shown by Figure 26. Behavior of both SEMI-
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN 




the migration of semi experienced doctors from rural to urban. Moreover, B4 also play an 
important role to gradually decrease the strength of R4 and flattening the behavior of 





Chapter 6: Policy analysis 
In the previous chapters we build the confidence in the system dynamic model developed to 
identify the cause of problematic behavior. In other word, we have developed an explanatory 
model that tends to replicate the reference mode behavior or problematic behavior with some 
degree of confidence arrived after performing several validation tests. Most often, we 
investigate the underlying system causing the problematic behavior to identify the cause agents 
and also aim to design improvements that may be helpful to alter the behavior. But before, 
current policies measures adopted by government of Nepal to address the issues are understood 
first. 
6.1 Current policy and policy choice 
The Government of Nepal has taken some measures to address problem of shortages of medical 
doctors pressures in the rural parts of Nepal due to the high uneven distribution of medical 
doctors because of internal migration from rural to urban parts of Nepal. The following are the 
major regulations adopted in retention and recruitment of medical workers in rural parts of 
Nepal: 
1. In Nepal, the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) has implemented a 
compulsory two-year rural service for all the scholarship holders of the Ministry of 
Education as stated in (Sitaula & Magar, 2011) study. The other government institution 
Patan Academy of Health Sciences (PAHS) was established with the goal of addressing 
the health manpower imbalance in rural Nepal which started to enroll students having 
a rural rearing and rural schooling in MBBS as per (Sapkota & Amatya, 2015). But 
study of  (Huntington et al., 2012) has an evidence of its effectiveness being short-term 
: “MOE programme may be effective in the short-term by forcing students into rural 
areas, but whether these students ultimately stay in rural areas beyond their 2-year 
obligation, or even stay in Nepal in the long term, should be tracked by the 
government”. 
2. The Residential Training opportunities is the most important incentive for Bachelor of 
Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) graduates. In order to recruit the medical 




rural Nepal. Such that on the basis of giving extra marks for work experience in remote 
rural areas they have higher chances for enrollment in a postgraduate institute in the 
country since 2002. The extra marks for enrollment in the Residential Training 
programme are given according to the remoteness of the areas posted as per the 
classification of the remote areas by the regulation of the Government. The highest 
extra marks are given up to maximum 20 and minimum 12 mark required to apply for 
study in the regulations.6 
There are various policy measures adapted for retention and recruitment of medical doctors in 
rural. But despite these interventions and programmes no any significant changes has been seen 
on the internal migration behaviour of medical doctors which in turn address the long-term 
balance in the distribution of medical doctors in Nepal. Most policies concerning migration in 
Nepal and other developing countries are focused at regulating internal migration only. As 
mentioned earlier, ‘brain drain” of skilled and qualified medical doctors to developed and high-
income earning country like USA and UK also compound the problem of medical doctors’ 
shortages in the country. Such policy has not affected the long-term retention thus, the 
following policy structure intervenes to through vacancy which has not been considered so far 
by policy makers. 
The explanatory model has been developed to understand the cause of doctor’s migration. As 
described in the Base run, intervention of several loop causes the problematic behavior and by 
shifting the strength of loops we can alter the problematic behavior to arrive at desired 
behavior. In that context, sensitivity analysis performed on the explanatory model identified 
some sensitive parameter that would lead the way for policy intervention.  
In this chapter, we introduce, explain and examine the policy intervention point, accompanying 
structure and alteration caused by such policy intervention to result in desirable change in 
problematic behavior. As previously mentioned, the initialization of the model resembles the 
existing distribution of the doctors in urban and rural area. It was identified that due to the 
lower number of doctors in rural area, loops that reinforce the number of doctors in rural area- 
(R5 and R7) is less effective and loop that reinforces migration from rural to urban (R1) is 
strongly effective. Moreover, a key element that tends to increase the number of doctors to 






the VACANCY is a possible policy intervention variable. Additionally, policy maker can 
practically intervene through vacancy while other behavioral elements are very subjective and 
clear intervention cannot be measured. 
6.2 Policy Structure 
This section describes the policy structure, which should be consider as a generic version of 
policy intervention. We have called this a generic version because it omits the policy 
implementation challenges while implementing this policy. More appropriately, this policy 
intervention can be thought as a desired wishful thinking that can be suggested in front of the 
policy maker to predetermine the impact of the suggested policy for achieving the desired 
result. 
Based on the sensitivity analysis, VACANCY was identified as the sensitive parameter to the 
model. It is also assumed as an exogenous parameter in the explanatory model which can be 
considered quite realistic as policy maker tends to ignore the feedback perspective while 
making decision to announce vacancy. This desired wishful thinking link attempts to 
endogenize the VACANCY by connect it to the assumed goal of eliminating discrepancy in 
doctor to population ratio in rural and urban region of Nepal. Figure 27 presents the explanatory 





Figure 27. Explanatory model with policy link 
In Figure 28, the dashed line represents the policy link, desired wishful link, that endogenizes 
the VACANCY in a way that tends to achieve the desired goal set for rural doctor anchored 
with the URBAN DOCTOR TO URBAN POPULATION RATIO. This link is a balancing 
loop that balances the vacancy in such a way that rural doctor to rural population tend to reach 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 28. Policy CLD: Feedback perspective 
During the analysis of the explanatory model, it was identified that the due to the less placement 
of doctors in rural area, loops that reinforce the number of doctors in rural area- (R5 and R7) 
is less effective and loop that reinforces migration from rural to urban (R1) is strongly effective. 
This resulted in higher deviation in the ratio of doctor to population in rural and urban area. 
With the goal to reduce this deviation, goal for the rural doctor to population ratio, DESIRED 
RURAL DOCTORS TO RURAL POPULATION RATIO, was set to match with that of 
URBAN DOCTOR TO URBAN POPULATION RATIO. This DESIRED RURAL 
DOCTORS TO RURAL POPULATION RATIO along with RURAL POPULATION 
determines the DESIRED TOTAL RURAL DOCTORS. A GAP BETWEEN ACTUAL AND 
DESIRED RURAL DOCTORS was determine which then set the goal for VACANCY, as 
DESIRED VACANCY.  
In order to see the behavior of the model before and after policy, POLICY SWITCH is used. 




































































































































































































































































with intervention, otherwise it represents the behavior of explanatory model. In addition to 
POLICY SWITCH, POLICY START TIME, POLICY STATUS and POLICY 
ADJUSTMENT TIME are added to the exploratory structure that suggests when policy kicks 
in, the activeness of policy and duration upon with desired goal is targeted to be achieved, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 29. Policy Run: RURAL DOCTOR TO RURAL POPULATION RATIO 
Figure 29 depicts that with policy intervention the model behavior has improved considerably 
as observed through the increase in RURAL DOCTOR TO RURAL POPULATION RATIO. 
This affirmative behavior is obtain with increased VACANCY that provided opportunities for 
doctor to work in rural area. With higher number of REGISTERED DOCTORS working in 
rural areas the workload for the doctor decreases resulting the job satisfaction loop (R5 and 
R7) further increasing the number of doctors in rural area. Moreover, higher job satisfaction 
increases the number of experienced doctors staying in rural area. This increases in 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL decreases RATION OF SEMI-EXPERIENCED TO 
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN RURAL. Consequently, this strengthens the goal for RURAL 
LEARNING LOOP-B1 resulting in higher SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTOR IN RURAL and 






















Figure 30. Policy Run: URBAN DOCTOR TO URBAN POPULATION RATIO 
However, this desirable increase in the RURAL DOCTOR TO RURAL POPULATION 
RATIO comes at the cost of URBAN DOCTOR TO URBAN POPULATION RATIO shown 
in Figure 30. As R5 and R7 loop gains strength, R6 and R8 loops loses strength resulting in the 
migration of doctors from urban to rural. The comparison of policy run for urban and rural area 
is shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31. Comparative policy run 
In Figure 31, it can be observed that as policy kicks in there is a substantial decrease in URBAN 
DOCTOR TO URBAN POPULATION RATIO as a trade-off which increase the RURAL 
DOCTOR TO RURAL POPULATION RATIO. It is practically impossible to constrain the 






































they are better off. However, it should be mentioned here that this decrease in URBAN 
DOCTOR TO URBAN POPULATION RATIO is mainly caused due the constant migration 
of urban doctor out of country, which is reportedly twenty percent, significantly high. 
FRACTION OF URBAN DOCTOR MIGRATING ABROAD is an exogenous parameter to 
the model as it is beyond the model boundary. 
 
Figure 32. SCENARIO RUN WITH ACTIVE POLICY  
An interesting behavior was identified, as shown in Figure 31, when the FRACTION OF 
URBAN DOCTOR MIGRATING ABROAD was tested for different value. It was noticed that 
when the FRACTION OF URBAN DOCTOR MIGRATING ABROAD is reduced to 0.03 
despite of an initial drop in urban doctor to population ratio, the model shows an equal 




























Chapter 7: Conclusion & Limitations 
Conclusion 
In Nepal, an imbalance in the distribution of doctors in rural and urban area has been pointed 
out as a major public health issue.  The uneven distribution of doctors is not the cause of lack 
of shortages of doctors as per MOHP in case of Nepal. There are sufficient number of doctors 
in Nepal produced every year. The root of the problem is that most of the doctors are based in 
urban areas and not serving the rural communities that need them most. This issue is further 
accelerated by the movement of doctors to overseas resulting to the wide discrepancy in the 
doctor to population ratio in rural versus urban location.  The research objective and questions 
have been formulated “based on the above-mentioned problem description that make a basis 
to capture the current structure of the Nepalese medical doctors’ movement using the system 
dynamic models. 
A detailed description of model structure summarizes the process of medical students’ 
enrolment for MBBS studies and composition of doctors in terms of rookies, semi-experienced, 
and experienced both in urban and rural. Moreover, the model looks on the feedback 
mechanism through CLD which explains how doctors move from rural to urban when the 
factors like learning opportunities, additional income and salary through dual practice and the 
work pressure affects job satisfaction; that in turn stimulates the migration flow. The balancing 
and reinforcing feedback loop, explains how B1 rural learning loop drives the strengths of R1 
loop which accelerates the movement of semi experienced doctors from rural to urban and vice 
versa. Similarly, the other major determinants governing the migration of doctor is income. 
Which is captured by the R4 loop; urban private income loop comes to an effect where the 
income of urban becomes higher as such the experienced doctors move from rural to urban but 
later B4 loop constrain it. In addition, the loop R5 and R7 loops captures the work pressure and 
job satisfaction effects of semi-experienced and experienced doctors in rural. Similarly, other 
balancing and reinforcing feedback mechanisms loops also explains the dynamics on why 
doctors are not relocating their practice area to the rural area.  
The base run and ideal run are performed in the model simulation that reflects the situation as 




that urban doctors’ ratios are higher compared to rural doctors; ratio due to the interactions of 
feedback loops. But in ideal run, these effects are considered to be zero meaning that there is 
lower discrepancy in the doctors’ ratio in rural vs. urban. From the simulation’s result, it is 
understood that a greater ratio of experienced doctors in comparison to experienced doctors in 
rural plays a critical role in determining the learning opportunities effects for doctor to continue 
to work in rural. It is also found that vacancy openings in rural is sensitive to driving these 
effects. More vacant places, more doctors working, less work pressure and more satisfaction 
to stay in the urban. 
Based on these results and sensitivity tests, a desired wishful thinking is developed to reduce 
this discrepancy to some extent. The proposed policy is based on the Vacancy which is assumed 
as an exogenous parameter in the explanatory model which can be considered quite realistic as 
policy maker tends to ignore the feedback perspective while making decision to announce 
vacancy. This desired wishful thinking link attempts to endogenize the VACANCY by connect 
it to the assumed goal of eliminating discrepancy in doctor to population ratio in rural and 
urban region of Nepal. 
Limitation and Further work  
The model built in this thesis held several assumptions. Thus, there are some limitations of the 
model and the modelling process which are mentioned below:   
• Currently, the model works on several exogenous variable that only fits in for this 
modelling scope. The exogeneous parameter like medical college capacity, reservation 
quota and others are based on the government strategies. Thus, endogenizing these 
parameters has not been done which is an important limitation of this model. 
• The model looks at the ratio of doctors to population ratio. It only considers the number 
of doctors for per population. It does not account any quality of health services provided 
to population.  
• This model considers only three determinants for the doctors’ migration. But there are 
other important factors like personal characteristics of the health worker, such as his or 
her place of origin (rural or urban), gender, age, have a significant impact on their 
employment decision. There are various empirical evidences that shows medical health 




urban or wealthier backgrounds. (Zimmerman et al., 2012), also found out that medical 
graduates with rural birthplace and graduation from rural high school were three to four 
times as likely to work in rural Nepal, compared with students raised in Kathmandu. 
This provides ground for further modelling considering the students’ background.  
• Different relative weights are assigned for the income, learning opportunities and 
work pressure and satisfaction based on the personal interview with doctors those are 
already practicing and has some experience. Thus, behavior of the model is limited to 
the weights assigned which might not be a realistic weight for a larger group of 
doctors.   
• The shape of effects of learning opportunities, effects of additional income and salary 
through dual practice and effects of work pressure and job satisfaction in migration 
were not explained in any formal literature so, it has been developed based on the 
mainly on the advice and confirmation from limited insights from few doctors on 
interviewed. Therefore, these shapes cannot be generalized. 
• The parameters value like income of doctors is not adjusted with the inflation rate. 
The income growth is not taken into account for this modelling. It is assumed to be 
constant which resemble another limitation of the model. 
• The elasticity of Crude death rate to doctors are obtained from the historical data which 
shows that change in crude death based on change in number of doctors. There are 
numerous factors that affect the crude death rate (such as improvement in medicine 
technology, well equipped machinery, and so on ) is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
• This research is based on secondary data sources, extracted from different online websites 
and databases with the related academics and researchers' book, and other health-related 
journals. One of the greatest challenges in this research is that data on medical doctors 
which was collected from publicly available databases with gaps completed by data 
extrapolation. These data may be far from perfection. Since the census is only conducted 
once every decade, the data on the population statistics were extracted from World Bank 
report. After comparing data from various administrative bodies within the government, it 
was close to accurate.  In fact, due to high numbers of undeclared migration either internal 
or external, Statistics Nepal has had to rely on estimations of other research work. These 
discrepancy between estimations only allow us for initial model testing and result 
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 Equation Properties Units Documentation 
policy_adj_time MAX(1,( policy_deadline-TIME))  year  
policy_deadline 2070  years  




 Dimensionless  
policy_switch 0  dmnl  
total_registered_doctors SUM(REGISTERED_DOCTORS)  doctor 
It is the sum total of array of REGISTERED DOCTORS from 








It is derived from the product between total urban population and 
fraction of urban population getting sick. 
ASSESSMENT_TIME 1  year 
It takes some time for doctor to assess the patients. It is assumed 
to be one here. 
AVERAGE_EXPENSE
S_PER_PATIENTS 
625  rupees/people 
this is an exgoneous varibale which doctors at private hospitals 
and clinics charge for their consultation Rs 250-450 for each 
appointment, based on the practitioner’s degree and experience. 
 









Salaries for health workers are given under Section 9 of the 
Health Service Act, with basic salaries which range from NRs 
11,290 to NRs 31,680 per month based on their qualification and 
number of experience in years. Additional allowances are given 
to provide a financial incentive for doctors at all levels who takes 




plus allowances which is again further calibrated. The data is 
derived from report on Human resources for 








Salaries for health workers are given under Section 9 of the 
Health Service Act, with basic salaries which range from NRs 
11,290 to NRs 31,680 per month based on their qualification and 
number of experience in years so, the value here is the average 
value which is again further calibrated. The data is derived from 
report on Human resources for 
health in Nepal-The politics of access in remote areas 
available at:https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/8329.pdf 
DELAY_TIME 1  year 
It takes sometime for patients to be recovered. SO, this delay 
captures the time frame of patients staying in hospital until they 




0.15  dmnl/year 
there is an agreement of doctors who are working on the private 
















it is the expected income of each doctor from their dual practice 




0.60  dmnl/year 
Out of total urban population only fraction of people get ill and 
are seeking for medical treatment. The value of this auxilliary 
variable is 77.4% from the study by Hotchkiss, Rous, 
Karmacharya & Sangraula (1998) on Household health 
expenditures in Nepal: Household health expenditures in 
Nepal:implications for health care financing reform. 
but for our modelling purpose, the calibrated value is used as 60% 
FRACTIONAL_URBA
N_RECOVERY_RATE 
0.93  dmnl/year 
The death rate of Nepal decreased from 8% to 6% from 2001 to 




asssumed that death are either people being sick or through 
natural death, with or without seeking the health facilities. thus, 
the fractional recovery rate of either rural area or urban area is 











It is defined as total income the doctors earn from the private 



















BAN = 100000 
people 
It is a stock concept which is the total number of patients visiting 
the private hospitals and clinics in urban. The stock gets depleted 
with increase in the RATE OF OUTGOING PATIENTS AT 
PRIVATE HOSPITALS IN URBAN after their recovery. 
Due to the lack of information on the individual private clinics, 















BAN = 422801 
people 
This is refers to total number of patients in the hospitals who are 
under medical treatment. It increases via increase in RATE OF 
INCOMING PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN URBAN 
and decreases with the RATE OF OUTGOING PATIENTS AT 
PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN URBAN after recovery. 
 





1460000  people 
It refers to the number of patients the government based public 
hospital in urban can handled. These accounts for the total 
number of patients either in need for emergency or OPD bed 
services the hospitals capable of handling.These are average 








After the public hospitals in urban area are running in the full 








nearby for the treatment. So, it is the inflow rate at which that 
accumulates in the stock of PATIENTS AT PRIVATE 









It is defined as the inflow of patients coming to the hospitals for 
treatment. The hospitals are only able to take the patients only 
when they have the Vacant places or minimum sick patients in 
urban whichever is low. They cannot go beyond their capacity so 
MIN function is used in the formulation. It accumulates the 









This rate of is outflow of patients from private hospitals and 
clinics in urban after being recovered. As, this flow increases, it 
depletes the number of sick people in private hospitals and clinics 
in Urban. Thus, the rate is based on the stock of PATIENTS AT 
PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN URBAN. More number of patients 










This rate of is outflow of patients from public hospitals in urban 
after being recovered. As, this flow increases, it depletes the 
number of sick people in public hospitals in Urban. Thus, the rate 
is based on the stock of PATIENTS AT PUBLIC HOSPITALS 
IN URBAN. More number of patients recovered, less would be 








This ratio is calculated to analyse the relative INCOME 
EFFECTS ON MIGRATION. If the RATIO OF RURAL 
INCOME TO URBAN INCOME is lower than 1, the 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL migrate from rural to 
urban location and if the ratio is higher than 1, the 











it is the total annual income of doctors from their basic salary and 











It represents the empty beds available for patients. It is calculated 
out of total CAPACITY of hospitals, the PATIENTS already 
under the medical attention are deducted and together with the 









GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
1.613333429), (2002.00, 1.753241687), 
(2003.00, 1.907030984), (2004.00, 
2.055914582), (2005.00, 2.262230768), 
(2006.00, 2.83810455), (2007.00, 
3.07096565), (2008.00, 3.179635811), 
(2009.00, 3.774057244), (2010.00, 
4.108730202), (2011.00, 4.48981222), 
(2012.00, 5.159478269), (2013.00, 
5.639973529), (2014.00, 6.26403545), 
(2015.00, 7.351833133), (2016.00, 
7.477781687), (2017.00, 7.749157601), 
(2018.00, 7.486195225) 




GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 902.0), 
(2002.00, 902.0), (2003.00, 972.0), 
(2004.00, 972.0), (2005.00, 972.0), 
(2006.00, 972.0), (2007.00, 1072.0), 
(2008.00, 1262.0), (2009.00, 1362.0), 
(2010.00, 1522.0), (2011.00, 1622.0), 
(2012.00, 1622.0), (2013.00, 1622.0), 
(2014.00, 1622.0), (2015.00, 1747.0), 
(2016.00, 1747.0), (2017.00, 1747.0), 
(2018.00, 1747.0) 
 doctor/year  
HISTORICAL_RURAL
_DOCTORS 
GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
1571.2), (2002.00, 1734.0), (2003.00, 
1913.2), (2004.00, 2090.4), (2005.00, 
2329.6), (2006.00, 2959.2), (2007.00, 
3240.8), (2008.00, 3391.6), (2009.00, 
4058.4), (2010.00, 4439.6), (2011.00, 
4856.4), (2012.00, 5570.0), (2013.00, 
6072.4), (2014.00, 6741.6), (2015.00, 
7944.4), (2016.00, 8154.8), (2017.00, 
8565.2), (2018.00, 8413.2) 




GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
0.749925482), (2002.00, 0.817743313), 
(2003.00, 0.892574931), (2004.00, 
0.965682827), (2005.00, 1.066448592), 




(2006.00, 1.342877542), (2007.00, 
1.458561909), (2008.00, 1.516007296), 
(2009.00, 1.806503707), (2010.00, 
1.974591566), (2011.00, 2.166566705), 
(2012.00, 2.500227579), (2013.00, 
2.744900086), (2014.00, 3.0623162), 
(2015.00, 3.610786946), (2016.00, 




GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
3928.0), (2002.00, 4335.0), (2003.00, 
4783.0), (2004.00, 5226.0), (2005.00, 
5824.0), (2006.00, 7398.0), (2007.00, 
8102.0), (2008.00, 8479.0), (2009.00, 
10146.0), (2010.00, 11099.0), (2011.00, 
12141.0), (2012.00, 13925.0), (2013.00, 
15181.0), (2014.00, 16854.0), (2015.00, 
19861.0), (2016.00, 20387.0), (2017.00, 
21413.0), (2018.00, 21033.0), (2019.00, 
21033.0), (2020.00, 21033.0) 
 doctor  
HISTORICAL_URBA
N_DOCTORS 
GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
2356.8), (2002.00, 2601.0), (2003.00, 
2869.8), (2004.00, 3135.6), (2005.00, 
3494.4), (2006.00, 4438.8), (2007.00, 
4861.2), (2008.00, 5087.4), (2009.00, 
6087.6), (2010.00, 6659.4), (2011.00, 
7284.6), (2012.00, 8355.0), (2013.00, 
9108.6), (2014.00, 10112.4), (2015.00, 
11916.6), (2016.00, 12232.2), (2017.00, 
12847.8), (2018.00, 12619.8) 




GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
6.940560846), (2002.00, 7.387254898), 
(2003.00, 7.870536827), (2004.00, 
8.311762671), (2005.00, 8.959921888), 
(2006.00, 11.01321149), (2007.00, 
11.67593586), (2008.00, 11.84589578), 
(2009.00, 13.77896081), (2010.00, 
14.70204158), (2011.00, 15.74623415), 
(2012.00, 17.73173822), (2013.00, 




18.99435399), (2014.00, 20.67038318), 
(2015.00, 23.7705456), (2016.00, 




GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
24347106.0), (2002.00, 24725627.0), 
(2003.00, 25080872.0), (2004.00, 
25419344.0), (2005.00, 25744500.0), 
(2006.00, 26066693.0), (2007.00, 
26382581.0), (2008.00, 26666576.0), 
(2009.00, 26883535.0), (2010.00, 
27013212.0), (2011.00, 27041437.0), 
(2012.00, 26989862.0), (2013.00, 
26917906.0), (2014.00, 26906926.0), 
(2015.00, 27015031.0), (2016.00, 
27261131.0), (2017.00, 27627124.0), 
(2018.00, 28087871.0) 
 person  
RURAL_HISTORICAL
_POPULATION 
GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
20951415.0), (2002.00, 21204698.0), 
(2003.00, 21434615.0), (2004.00, 
21646859.0), (2005.00, 21844466.0), 
(2006.00, 22036261.0), (2007.00, 
22219146.0), (2008.00, 22371924.0), 
(2009.00, 22465495.0), (2010.00, 
22483637.0), (2011.00, 22415188.0), 
(2012.00, 22277972.0), (2013.00, 
22122481.0), (2014.00, 22014709.0), 
(2015.00, 22001852.0), (2016.00, 
22097328.0), (2017.00, 22285143.0), 
(2018.00, 22543325.0) 
 person  
URBAN_HISTORICA
L_POPULATION 
GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2001.00, 
3395691.0), (2002.00, 3520929.0), 
(2003.00, 3646257.0), (2004.00, 
3772485.0), (2005.00, 3900034.0), 
(2006.00, 4030432.0), (2007.00, 
4163435.0), (2008.00, 4294652.0), 
(2009.00, 4418040.0), (2010.00, 
4529575.0), (2011.00, 4626249.0), 
(2012.00, 4711890.0), (2013.00, 




4795425.0), (2014.00, 4892217.0), 
(2015.00, 5013179.0), (2016.00, 







RURAL_DOCTORS") Points: (0.500, 
2.000), (0.650, 1.716), (0.800, 1.362), 
(0.950, 1.108), (1.000, 1.000), (1.250, 
0.745), (1.400, 0.640), (1.550, 0.596), 
(1.700, 0.548), (1.850, 0.526979314943), 
(2.000, 0.500) 
 dmnl 
The improvement in hiring and retention of experienced doctor in 
rural increases the chances for the semi-skilled doctors to 
continue to practice and serve the public in rural and thus reduces 
the learning gap. As the gap narrows the between the stock of 
SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL to 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL, the higher learning 





URBAN_DOCTORS") Points: (0.500, 
2.000), (0.650, 1.716), (0.800, 1.362), 
(0.950, 1.108), (1.000, 1.000), (1.250, 
0.745), (1.400, 0.640), (1.550, 0.596), 
(1.700, 0.548), (1.850, 0.526979314943), 
(2.000, 0.500) 
 dmnl 
The improvement in hiring and retention of experienced doctor in 
urban increases the chances for the semi-skilled doctors to 
continue to practice and serve the public in urban and thus 
reduces the learning gap. As the gap narrows the between the 
stock of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN to 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN URBAN, the higher learning 





_on_learning_urban) Points: (0.500, 
1.000), (0.650, 0.986), (0.800, 0.908), 
(0.950, 0.786), (1.000, 0.750), (1.250, 
0.606), (1.400, 0.480), (1.550, 0.353), 




This effect of learning on migration of semi-experienced doctors 
represent the tendency how semi-experienced doctors tend to 
move to and flow rural and urban sector depending on the ratio of 
semi-experienced doctor to urban doctors for both rural and urban 
sector. The y-axis range from -0.5 to 1 for x-axis value of 0.5 to 
1.5 suggesting that should increase more than 100% to trigger the 
movement of doctor from urban to rural. Moreover, -0.5 in y-axis 
suggest that only half of the normal leaving rate would migrate 
for more than 100% increase in income. 
 
In the absence of literature, the shape of the graph was first 
estimated by the modeller based on the information derived from 
motivational theory and limited literature that studied income as 
determining factor for migration. Afterwards, the shape of the 
curve was validated through interview with the few doctors 













It is the ratio to measure the learning of doctors in terms of 
staffing gap in rural setting. More experienced doctor means more 
guidance and sharing in the work pressure, and thus more 
learning opportunities in workplace.(Pilon & Herweg, 2001). if 
the ratio is lower than 1, the learning is more for semi-
experienced doctors from experienced doctors in rural but if the 











It is the ratio to measure the learning of doctors in terms of 
staffing gap in urban setting. More experienced doctor means 
more guidance and sharing in the work pressure, and thus more 
learning opportunities in workplace.(Pilon & Herweg, 2001). if 
the ratio is lower than 1, the learning is more for semi-
experienced doctors from experienced doctors in urban but if the 







336000  rupees/year 
Salaries for health workers are given under Section 9 of the 
Health Service Act, with basic salaries which range from NRs 
11,290 to NRs 31,680 per month based on their qualification and 
number of experience in years. Additional allowances are given 
to provide a financial incentive for doctors at all levels who takes 
the posts in remote areas. So, the value here is the average salary 
plus allowances which is again further calibrated. The data is 
derived from report on Human resources for 







300000  rupees/year 
Salaries for health workers are given under Section 9 of the 
Health Service Act, with basic salaries which range from NRs 
11,290 to NRs 31,680 per month based on their qualification and 
number of experience in years so, the value here is the average 
value which is again further calibrated. The data is derived from 
report on Human resources for health in Nepal-The politics of 


















These are the registered doctor available after rural service 
placement through reservation quota and vacancy openings. It is 
maximum of 0 or total registered doctors available after rate of 







It is actual vacancy available for rural postings after those doctors 





18  year 
In Nepal, there is provision of minimum 30 years for service to be 
provided and then get retired. so, the retirement age after being 




18  year 
In Nepal, there is provision of minimum 30 years for service to be 
provided and then get retired. so, the retirement age after being 





2  years 
This is the average time to gain experience for rookies to be semi-
experienced doctors in urban. For consistency purpose with rural 
rookies we assumed to be 2 years. 
AVERAGE_TIME_TO
_GAIN_EXPERIENCE 
10  years 
This is the average time to gain experience from semi-experience 






























These are the freshly licensed doctors and placed under rural 
location through the vacancy openings for rural positions. It is 
stock that increases as the rate of RURAL VACANCY 
FULFILLMENT INCREASES and decreases with completion of 





kground]) * dt 
CY[rural_backg






















_TO_URBAN_INCOME) Points: (0.500, 
1.000), (0.600, 0.983), (0.700, 0.974), 
(0.800, 0.948), (0.900, 0.873), (1.000, 
0.700), (1.100, 0.397), (1.200, -0.050), 





This effect of income on migration of semi-experienced doctors 
represent the tendency how semi-experienced doctors tend to 
move to and flow rural and urban sector depending on the ratio of 
income. The y-axis range from -0.5 to 1 for x-axis value of 0.5 to 
1.5 suggesting that rural income should increase more than 100% 
to trigger the movement of doctor from urban to rural. Moreover, 
-0.5 in y-axis suggest that only half of the normal leaving rate 
would migrate for more than 100% increase in income. 
 
It shows the effect of income on migration with ratio of RURAL 
INCOME TO URBAN INCOME. A wider income gap between 
the two locations increases the propensity to migrate thereby 
raising the NORMAL LEAVING RATE OF DOCTORS with 
rural background and urban background. 
 
In the absence of literature, the shape of the graph was first 
estimated by the modeller based on the information derived from 
motivational theory and limited literature that studied income as 
determining factor for migration. Afterwards, the shape of the 
curve was validated through interview with the few doctors 
practicing in urban area. 
 
AS per the report (Reducing Geographical Imbalances of Health 
Workers in Sub- Saharan Africa: A Labor Market Perspective on 
What Works, What Does Not, and Why) "the older doctors cite 
weak remuneration as their main reason for not considering rural 
positions. Older doctors face a higher opportunity cost for moving 
to rural areas, as the reputation they have built in the city o􏰸en 








(0.500, 1.000), (0.600, 0.983), (0.700, 
0.974), (0.800, 0.948), (0.900, 0.873), 
(1.000, 0.700), (1.100, 0.397), (1.200, -
0.050), (1.300, -0.255), (1.400, -0.408), 
(1.500, -0.500) 
 dmnl 
This effect of income on migration of semi-experienced doctors 
represent the tendency how semi-experienced doctors tend to 
move to and flow rural and urban sector depending on the ratio of 
income. The y-axis range from -0.5 to 1 for x-axis value of 0.5 to 
1.5 suggesting that rural income should increase more than 100% 
to trigger the movement of doctor from urban to rural. Moreover, 
-0.5 in y-axis suggest that only half of the normal leaving rate 
would migrate for more than 100% increase in income. 
 
In the absence of literature, the shape of the graph was first 
estimated by the modeller based on the information derived from 
motivational theory and limited literature that studied income as 
determining factor for migration. Afterwards, the shape of the 
curve was validated through interview with the few doctors 
practicing in urban area. 




















It is a stock of ‘veteran’ doctors which have developed relevant 
and wide competencies in the practice and study: this means that 
their expertise is the highest of the entire doctor’s workforce in 
rural. They have already 10 years of experience in medicine 
practice. They provide coaching and training to SEMI-
EXPERIENCED and ROOKIES in rural. The stock increases 
with the increase in inflow of DOCTORS GAINING 
EXPERIENCE IN RURAL and decreases with the RATE OF 
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR LEAVING for urban and RATE OF 






























It is a stock of ‘veteran’ doctors which have developed relevant 
and wide competencies in the practice and study: this means that 















urban. They have already 10 years of experience in medicine 
practice. They provide coaching and training to SEMI-
EXPERIENCED and ROOKIES in urban. The stock increases 
with the increase in inflow of DOCTORS GAINING 
EXPERIENCE IN URBAN and decreases with the RATE OF 
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR LEAVING for abroad and RATE OF 

























0.2  dmnl/year 
The FRACTION OF URBAN 
DOCTOR MIGRATING ABROAD, exogenous parameter 
influences the RATE OF SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
OUT MIGRATION and RATE OF-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
OUT MIGRATION.  











 doctor  
HIRING_DELAY 1.5  year 
It represents the average number of days it takes for a candidate 
(doctor) to proceed from application process for an open position 
to accepting a position and placement to the respective location It 
takes more than 1.5 year in case of Nepal due to the combination 





Karki, K. B., Nepal, A., & Acharya, A. (2012). Human Resources 
for Health Management from Central to District Level in Nepal: 
A Report of Operational Research, May 2012 (Vol. 4). Society 
for Local Integrated Development Nepal. 
MIGRATION_DECISI
ON_DELAY 
5  year 




2  year 
The Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP) has implemented 
a compulsory two year service contract in government health 
facilities for all the scholarship holders of the Ministry of 


















nd] = 10 
doctor 
These are the stocks of those students who have become doctors 
from the scholarship scheme or reservation quota alloted by the 
government and obliged to be placed and practice in rural area for 
atleast few years. This stock gets accumulated with increase in 
RATE OF RURAL SERVICE ACCEPTANCE and drained with 

























0.02  dmnl/year 
It is the natural migration rate of doctors from urban to rural. The 






0.1    
NORMAL_LEAVING_
RATE_OF_DOCTORS












0.09   
 
 
It is the natural migration rate of doctors from urban to rural. The 
values are assumed for calibration. 
PLACEMENT_DELAY 1.5  year 
This is the time required for the scholarship students who have 
owed to go to rural area through compulsory rural service 
bonding to go and get settled after being licensed from NMC. 
Government posting are usually announced every year and it 
requires six months to collect information of scholarship doctors, 
arrange legal contractual agreements and finally sanction the 










It is a inflow rate at which the available doctors after rural 
postings and compulsory rural service employed themselves in 

















It is the retirement rate of doctors in rural after completing their 
30 years of employment duration in rural settings.it decreases the 










It is the retirement rate of doctors in urban after completing their 
30 years of employment duration in urban settings. it decreases 










It is the bi-flow concept that guides the experienced doctors' 
movement from to and from rural versus urban. since, the 
decision of movement or continue to stay is affected by the 
important factors decision variable for the EXPERIENCED 




















DELAY))) + (IF 
effect_of_income_on_migration_of_exper


















RATION_DECISION_DELAY))) ) ELSE 
0 
perceived job satisfaction. If the effect switch is on, all these 
decision variables control the movement. But if these are switch 
are turned off, the doctors movement is guided by the NORMAL 
LEAVING RATE OF DOCTORS FROM RURAL TO URBAN 
and FROM URBAN TO RURAL. 
RATE_OF_EXPERIEN
CED_DOCTOR_LEAV
IF Effect_Switch=1 THEN ( (IF 
effect_of_perceived_difference_of_rural_t
o_urban_job_satisfaction_in_migration>0 
























N_DELAY))) + (IF 
effect_of_income_on_migration_of_exper





































The government started a 2-year bonding 
service program in 2004. This is an inflow of those students who 
are under the government scholarship, medical/dental doctors 
have to serve in the assigned rural places for 2 years as stated in 
Tamang, Poudel, Karki, & Gautam, (2020) article. It accumulates 
to increase the stock of NEWLY PLACED SCHOLARSHIP 





IF Effect_Switch=1 THEN ( (IF 
effect_of_learning_on_migration>0 





























It is the bi-flow concept that guides the semi-experienced doctors' 
movement from to and from rural versus urban. since, the 
decision of movement or continue to stay is affected by the 
important factors decision variable for the SEMI-
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS’ LEAVING (movement or 
relocation) is the learning opportunities in terms of guidance, 
supervision and mentoring to continuing education (professional 
courses and workshops) from the senior experienced doctors, 
income and perceived job satisfaction. If the effect switch is on, 
all these decision variables control the movement. But if these are 
switch are turned off, the doctors movement is guided by the 
NORMAL LEAVING RATE OF DOCTORS FROM RURAL 




































IF Effect_Switch=1 THEN ( (IF 
effect_of_learning_on_migration>0 








































)) + (IF 
effect_of_income_on_migration_of_semi































It is the rate of outflow of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
















It is the rate of outflow of EXPERIENCED DOCTORS from 







This ratio is calculated to analyse the relative INCOME 
EFFECTS ON MIGRATION OF SEMI-EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS. If the RATIO OF RURAL INCOME TO URBAN 
INCOME is lower than 1, the SEMI-EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN RURAL migrate from rural to urban location and 
if the ratio is higher than 1, the SEMI-EXPERIENCED 




















National Medical Council is official governmental body that 
distribute the eligibility certificate for those who passed their 
exam and are registered doctors (source: 
https://www.nmc.org.np/). The registered doctors are the 
cumulative number of doctors who passed the national exam 
every year in total. The total number of registered doctor 
increases with the increasing PASSING RATE and drained out 
with the outflow RATE OF RURAL SERVICE ACCEPTANCE, 
RURAL VACANCYFULFILLMENT RATE and PLACEMeNT 






















TANCE[urban_background]) * dt 
RESERVATION_QUO
TA_SEATS 
0.136  dmnl 
Nepal’s Ministry of Education (MOE) has been providing a 
scholarship programme in which Nepali-owned private medical 
schools must reserve 10% of each class for the free education of 
students. The increase in reservation quota did increase the rural 
doctor ratio but such increase in rural doctor ratio decreases the 
urban doctor ratio. 
As per Nepal_MBBS_Scholarship_Study_Report.pdf 124 per 
year so out of 902 thus, 124/904= 13.6% 
 


















round] = 55 
doctor 
These are the stock of those doctors at their first job experience, 
that are freshly graduates and registered without any experience 
as licensed doctors. They do not have skills and expertise in their 
practice; thus, they need training and know how sharing with 
more skilled doctors in order to improve their skills. This is stock 
accumulated by the rate of inflow of PLACEMENT OF FRESH 
PASS OUT IN URBAN AREA and drained by the outflow of 


























This is an inflow rate at which RURAL VACANCY IS 




































It is a stock of those with some years of experience in the practice 
in rural location.They have achieved a certain 2 years of 
experience in their job career and are ready to provide training to 
NEWLY PLACED SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS IN RURAL 
and DOCTORS IN RURAL THROUGH VACANCY. The stock 
increases with the increase in inflow of RATE OF 
COMPULSORY PUBLIC SERVICE and RATE OF RURAL 
SERVICE and decreases with the RATE OF SEMI-
EXPERIENCED DOCTOR LEAVING for urban and DOCTORS 













































It is a stock of those with some years of experience in the practice 
in rural location.They have achieved a certain 2 years of 
experience in their job career and are ready to provide training to 
ROOKIE DOCTORS IN URBAN. The stock increases with the 
increase in inflow of RATE OF URBAN SERVICE and 
decreases with the RATE OF SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTOR 
LEAVING for rural or abroad and DOCTORS GAINING 



































It is the sum total of array of DOCTORS IN RURAL THROUGH 








It is the sum total of array of EXPERIENCED DOCTORS in 







It is the sum total of array of EXPERIENCED DOCTORS in 








It is the sum total of array of NEWLY PLACED SCHOLARSHIP 








It is the sum total of array of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 








It is the sum total of array of SEMI-EXPERIENCED DOCTORS 
in urban from rural background and urban background. 
Vacancy_announcement
_time 
1  year 
it is the time taken by PSC for vacancy announcement. it usually 









 doctor/year It is the total vacancy available for rural background each year 
weight_of_income 0.3  dmnl 
There are several determinants of job satisfaction such as pay, 
work motivation,workload, integration as stated by Agho, A.O., 
Price , J.L, & Mueller ,C.W. (1993) in Determinants of Employee 
Job Satisfaction : An Empirical Test of Causal Model. Human 
Relations, 46 (8): 1007-1027.  
So, we have assigned the weight as 30% based on the response 
from few doctors's interview. 
weight_of_income_for_
experienced_doctor 
1-weight_of_JS_for_experienced_doctor  dmnl 
There are several determinants of job satisfaction such as pay, 
work motivation,workload, integration as stated by Agho, A.O., 
Price , J.L, & Mueller ,C.W. (1993) in Determinants of Employee 
Job Satisfaction : An Empirical Test of Causal Model. Human 
Relations, 46 (8): 1007-1027.  
So, we have assigned the weight as 40% based on the response 
from few doctors's interview. 
weight_of_job_satisfacti
on 
1-weight_of_income-weight_of_learning  dmnl 
There are several determinants of job satisfaction such as pay, 
work motivation,workload, integration as stated by Agho, A.O., 
Price , J.L, & Mueller ,C.W. (1993) in Determinants of Employee 
Job Satisfaction : An Empirical Test of Causal Model. Human 
Relations, 46 (8): 1007-1027.  
So, we have assigned the weight as 100% based on the response 
from few doctors's interview. 
weight_of_JS_for_exper
ienced_doctor 
0.6  dmnl 
There are several determinants of job satisfaction such as pay, 
work motivation,workload, integration as stated by Agho, A.O., 
Price , J.L, & Mueller ,C.W. (1993) in Determinants of Employee 
Job Satisfaction : An Empirical Test of Causal Model. Human 
Relations, 46 (8): 1007-1027.  
So, we have assigned the weight as 60% based on the response 
from few doctors's interview. 
weight_of_learning 0.5  dmnl 
There are several determinants of job satisfaction such as pay, 
work motivation,workload, integration as stated by Agho, A.O., 
Price , J.L, & Mueller ,C.W. (1993) in Determinants of Employee 
Job Satisfaction : An Empirical Test of Causal Model. Human 




So, we have assigned the weight as 50% based on the response 






607  doctor/year 
This value is estimated on the basis of report by ILO on migration 
of health workers from Nepal It is the average of 6 years from 












This is the rate of flow of students who returned from abroad after 
finishing their studies. Dozens of students go to foreign countries 
for the purpose of MBBS studies due to the limited number of 
medical seats availability. 
DROP_OUT_FRACTI
ON 
0.054  dmnl/year 
Every year in medical studies, certain percentage of students 
leave medical school before finishing their study due to various 
reasons like socio-economic, vast and overloaded curriculum and 
other factors as explained in the study in Bangladesh. The 
fraction we have taken here is 5.4% cited in the same paper which 
is used as a basis as exact data for Nepal was not available. Also, 




Miah, M. A., Khan, M. A. W., Talukder, M. H. K., Begum, F., 
Nargis, T., Khan, T. F., ... & Ali, S. I. (2011). Reasons of 
Dropouts and Defaulters of Medical Students in Bangladesh. 







This is one of the outflow of stock. Every year certain percentage 
of the medical students leaves their studies which decreases the 
stock of total number of medical students. 
FRACTIONAL_INCRE
ASE_IN_SEATS 
0.0438  dmnl/year 
The fractional increase in seat is the average increment in medical 
college seats that has been allocated by Nepal MedicaL Council 
(NMC) for Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery to 
medical colleges for every academic year. Ministry of Education 
and Institute of Medicine publish information regarding the 




acedemic year. Information available from these sources along 
with the information from the website of each medical colleges 
allowed to identify the number of acutal seat which was then used 
to determine the FRACTIONAL INCREASE IN SEATS. 








These are the students who are graduated after completion of 5.5 
year studies which decreases the number of MBBS students in 
every year. 
Therefore, it is the outflow from the students stock which is the 














ground] = 110 
doctor 
The stock is the accumulation of students who are studying the 
MBBS in the medical college and university. In order to 
differentiate the students background, the array is constructed. 
The urban and rural background are distinguished as likelihood of 
working in rural practice is approximately twice greater among 
doctors with a rural background as stated by Laven & Wilkinson 
(2003). therefore we assumed the same.Out of total general quota, 
5% are from the rural background and the remaining from urban 
in Nepal.Huntington, Shrestha, Reich, & Hagopian, (2011)  
 




Laven, G., &amp; Wilkinson, D. (2003). Rural doctors and rural 
backgrounds: how strong is the evidence? 





















5.5  year 
Generally the medical education in Nepal is a 5.5 year curriculum 
based on the British medical education model as stated by 
Huntington, Shrestha, Reich, & Hagopian, (2011)). Thus, the 





CITY_(MBBS)"(t - dt) + 
(NET_INCREASE_IN_SEATS_CAPACI








Nepal Medical Council allocated seats for Bachelor of Medicine 
and Bachelor of Surgery to medical colleges for every academic 
year  
 
The initial value is the number of seat capacity in year 2001. The 




















The medical graduates includes total number of medical students 
who are graduated every year and also those students who are 
returned back from foreign after completion of their medical 
studies. Ever year approximately 2000 students are graduated 
from Nepal as per (Ministry of health and Population-Human 




























it is an inflow that increases the medical college seats capacity 




0.47  dmnl/year 
NMC PASSING RATE is the rate at which medical graduates 
pass license exam in order to become a registered doctor to be 
eligible for clinical practise. The rate of passing the NMC varies 
from 41% to 53% every year. Thus, average value of 47% is used 













It is the rate at which the medical graduates passed the National 
medical council exam. Every Medical graduates has to passed this 
exam to be registered as medical doctors and work as 
professionals doctor in the hospital. it is the product of medical 




0.05  dmnl 
It is the fraction of students from rural background out of total 
students enrolled. The value is an estimation from  
Huntington, Shrestha, Reich, & Hagopian (2012) reserach on 
Career intentions of medical students in the setting of Nepal’s 
rapidly expanding private medical education system. Health 





RURAL_STUDENTS  doctor/year 
This inflow is the sum of rural and urban student that accumulates 
stock of MBBS STUDENTS. It is based on the total medical 












These are the students who are either born and brought up in rural 






These are the students who are either born and brought up in 























It is defined as a doctor per people.The doctors to population ratio 
is obtained by dividing total doctors by total population. In order 






-0.18  dmnl 
This variable measures the proportional change in DOCTORS 
following the same proportional change in FRACTIONAL 
RURAL CRUDE DEATH RATE. 
It is set to a very low value -0.18 as historical data have shown 
that between 2000 and 2018 the majority of DECREASE in crude 






-0.18  dmnl 
This variable measures the proportional change in DOCTORS 
following the same proportional change in FRACTIONAL 
URBAN CRUDE DEATH RATE. 
It is set to a very low value -0.18 as historical data have shown 
that between 2000 and 2018 the majority of DECREASE in crude 





0.02  dmnl/year 
This is a fraction of URBAN POPULATION who are moving out 





0.0202  dmnl/year 














It is the outflow that affects the stock of RURAL POPULATION. 
The study from (Shetty & Shetty, 2014) concluded that the 
doctors per capita (primary health care physician) had an inverse 
association with mortality rate (CRUDE DEATH RATE). The 




0.004  dmnl/year 
















It is the outflow that affects the stock of URBAN POPULATION. 
The study from (Shetty & Shetty, 2014) concluded that the 
doctors per capita (primary health care physician) had an inverse 
association with mortality rate (CRUDE DEATH RATE). The 




0.006  dmnl/year 
The INITIAL FRACTIONAL RURAL CRUDE DEATH RATE, 
exogenous parameter influences the FRACTIONAL RURAL 
CRUDE DEATH RATE. The rate is extracted as 0.006 from 






0.0012  dmnl/year 
The INITIAL FRACTIONAL urban CRUDE DEATH RATE, 
exogenous parameter influences the FRACTIONAL URBAN 









These are the people who are leaving the rural location which 
decreases the population of that area. This is a outflow that 




0.01  dmnl/year 
IIt is the internal migration rate of people from rural to urban 
area.The NET RURAL TO URBAN MIGRATION RATE, 
exogenous parameter influences the NATURAL MIGRATION 
RATE. The rate is extracted as 0.03 per year  
from Tiwari(2008) report on Urban migration and urbanization in 






These are the people who are leaving from URBAN location to 
out of the country which decreases the population of that area.It is 
generally the international migration. Therefore, this is a outflow 
that depletes the stock of URBAN POPULATION which is the 
product of FRACTION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 






It is an inflow that increases the rural population which is 
estimated through the multiplication of rural crude birth rate with 










It is an outflow which decreases the RURAL POPULATION. 
The RURAL CRUDE DEATH RATE is determined through 
either maximum of zero or the product of FRACTIONAL 








The rural doctors to rural population ratio is calculated by 
dividing total registered doctors in rural by total rural population. 




RURAL_POPULATION(t - dt) + 
(RURAL_CRUDE_BIRTH_RATE - 
RURAL_CRUDE_DEATH_RATE - 






It is the stock of people living in the rural part of Nepal. The 
inflow "RURAL CRUDE BIRTH RATE" adds to the stock 
through the number of births per year and the stock is depleted by 
the outflow RURAL CRUDE DEATH RATE AND THE 
NATURAL MIGRATION RATE. The initial value of 20951415 
refers to the number of people living in the remote and rural part 
of Nepal as documented by World bank report for the year 2000 
and United Nations - World Population Prospects 





It is the sum of TOTAL DOCTORS IN RURAL and TOTAL 











It is sum of DOCTORS IN RURAL THROUGH VACANCY, 
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL, NEWLY PLACED 
SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS IN RURAL AND SEMI 









It is sum of ROOKIE DOCTORS IN URBAN, EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN URBAN AND SEMI EXPERIENCED 






It represents the population of whole country. TOTAL 
POPULATION includes permanent population i.e. those people 
originally living there and floating population i.e. people who are 











It is an inflow that increases the urban population which is 
estimated through the multiplication of urban crude birth rate 







It is an outflow which decreases the URBAN POPULATION. 
The URBAN CRUDE DEATH RATE is determined through 
either maximum of zero or the product of FRACTIONAL 








The urban doctors to urban population ratio is calculated by 
dividing total doctors in rural by total rural population. In order to 
get the ratio is 10000, the population is further divided by 10000. 
URBAN_POPULATIO
N(t) 


















It is the stock of people living in the rural part of Nepal. The 
inflow " URBAN CRUDE BIRTH RATE" adds to the stock 
through the number of births per year and the stock is depleted by 
the outflow URBAN CRUDE DEATH RATE and OUT 
MIGRATION RATE. The initial value of 20951415 refers to the 
number of people living in the remote and rural part of Nepal as 
documented by World bank report for the year 2000 United 
Nations - World Population Prospects 





0.034  dmnl/year 
Increase in rural vacancy increases the rural doctors population 
but decreases the urban doctors population. 
The vacancy increment rate is only 3.4% from the year 1991 and 
2011 as per the report of MOPH- Human Resources for Health 
Strategic Plan 2011-2015 Draft. 
RATE_OF_INCREASE
_IN_VACANCY 
IF policy_status=1 THEN 
VACANCY_GAP/policy_adj_time ELSE 
 doctor/year 








VACANCY(t - dt) + 
(RATE_OF_INCREASE_IN_VACANC





The PSC can advertise vacancies once a year for medical officer 
posts. It is a stock that accumulates with the rate of increase 
vacancy every year. 
 
The initial vacancy is obtained from data provided by MOPH- 




There are 1447 sanctioned posts for public hospitals out of which 
335 are scholarship. so, without scholarship, the sanctioned posts 
is 1112 and there is only 40% going for rural positions. so, the 






It represents the vacancy the percentage of jobs you fill out of the 






 doctor  
VACANCY_OCCUPA
NCY_RATE 
0.7684  dmnl/year 
The vacancy occupancy rate is the percentage at which the 
vacancy is fullfilled. sometimes its not 100% vacancy sanctioned 
is occupied 
Out of total vacancy openings and sanctioned posts only 76.84% 
are filled positions as per the Annual Report, DoHS, 2007/08 













It is the actual satisfaction out of maximum satisfaction, obtained 
by doctors while working in the rural in terms work pressure in 
actual income per patients treated and actual number of patients 



















It is the actual satisfaction out of maximum satisfaction, obtained 
by doctors while working in the urban in terms work pressure in 
actual income per patients treated and actual number of patients 









This variable represent the total number of actual patients treated 
by total doctors in a rural in a year. It is calculated as stock of 
total patients at public hospital divided by the total registered 











This variable represent the total number of actual patients treated 
from public hospitals and patients visiting the private hospitals 
and clinics in urban area by total registered urban doctors in a 
year. It is calculated as sum of stock of total patients at public 
hospital and private hospitals and clinics in urban divided by the 









It is derived from the product between total rural population and 





2  YEAR 
It takes some time for building and adjusting the perceptions on 
job satisfaction. so, The adjustment process will take place over a 







BAN) Points: (0.500, 0.989960723614), 
(0.650, 0.948), (0.800, 0.891), (0.950, 
0.703), (1.000, 0.602), (1.250, 0.160), 
 dmnl 
It is a graphical function that shows the magnitude of the effect of 
difference in job satisfaction on migration.  
As per Holmström & Elf (2004, July), a decline in job satisfaction 
will cause an increase in staff attrition. Here, we assumed that 





(1.400, -0.102), (1.550, -0.281), (1.700, -
0.382), (1.850, -0.469), (2.000, -0.500) 
 
This effect of perceived difference of rural to urban 
job satisfaction in migration of semi-experienced doctors 
represent the tendency how semi-experienced doctors tend to 
move to and flow rural and urban sector depending on the 
PERCEIVED RATIO 
OF JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL TO URBAN. The y-axis 
range from -0.5 to 1 for x-axis value of -0.5 to 2 suggesting that 
RURAL JOB SATISFACTION should increase more than 100% 
to trigger the movement of doctor from urban to rural. Moreover, 
-0.5 in y-axis suggest that only half of the normal leaving rate 
would migrate for more than 100% increase in job satisfaction. 
 
In the absence of literature, the shape of the graph was first 
estimated by the modeller based on the information derived from 
motivational theory and limited literature that studied income as 
determining factor for migration. Afterwards, the shape of the 
curve was validated through interview with the few doctors 
practicing in urban area. 
 
 
Holmström, P., & Elf, M. (2004, July). Staff retention and job 
satisfaction at a hospital clinic-a case 
study. In 22nd International Conference of the System Dynamics 
Society, University of Oxford, 












0.634470710685), (0.7500, 0.7500), 






It represents the number of patients treated in terms of per rupee 
income relative to the STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENTS 
to measure the Work Pressure in terms of monetary units. As we 
















0.634470710685), (0.7500, 0.7500), 






It represents the number of patients treated in terms of per rupee 
income relative to the STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENTS 
to measure the Work Pressure in terms of monetary units. As we 







RURAL) Points: (0.5000, 1.0000), 











Workplace stress (WS) has been found to affect job satisfaction 
(JS) and turnover intention. The study by Chao, Jou, Liao & Kuo 
(2015) found that WS had a positive 
effect on turnover intention but negative effect on job satisfaction. 
It is a graphical function that shows the non linear negative 
relationships, as the workload pressure increases, the job 
satisfaction decreases. We have assumed that when workload is 
zero, the effect on job satisfaction is highest and when the 


















Workplace stress (WS) has been found to affect job satisfaction 
(JS) and turnover intention. The study by Chao, Jou, Liao & Kuo 
(2015) found that WS had a positive 
effect on turnover intention but negative effect on job satisfaction. 
It is a graphical function that shows the non linear negative 
relationships, as the workload pressure increases, the job 
satisfaction decreases. We have assumed that when workload is 
zero, the effect on job satisfaction is highest and when the 








0.5  DMNL 
It is the fraction that people who have severe illness and seeking 





0.54  dmnl/year 
Out of total rural population only fraction of people get ill and are 
seeking for medical treatment. The value of this auxilliary 
variable is 66.8% from the study by Hotchkiss, Rous, 
Karmacharya & Sangraula (1998) on Household health 
expenditures in Nepal: Household health expenditures in 
Nepal:implications for health care financing reform 
FRACTIONALRURAL
_RECOVERY_RATE 
0.93  dmnl/year 
The death rate of Nepal decreased from 8% to 6% from 2001 to 
2018. so, taking the average of two years we get 7%. therefore we 
asssumed that death are either people being sick or through 
natural death, with or without seeking the health facilities. thus, 
the fractional recovery rate of either rural area is assumed 












It is money in terms of rupees received by doctors while treating 
each sick person in the hospital. It is calculated by dividing 
AVERAGE NORMAL RURAL INCOME and ACTUAL 








It is money in terms of rupees received by doctors while treating 
each sick person in the hospital. It is calculated by dividing 
TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME OF URBAN DOCTORS and 
ACTUAL PATIENTS TREATED IN URBAN. 
MAXIMUM_JOB_SAT
ISFACTION_LEVEL 
1  dmnl 
This is the standard value for satisfaction. The maximum job 













RAL = 100000 
people 
The patients at public hospital in rural represents the stock of 
people who are ill and who are under medical treatments. the 
stock accumulates through the inflow of incoming patients and is 







The stock is initialize at 100000 in base year 2001 which is to be 











This variable represents the perceived difference in job 
satisfaction in rural and urban. As the difference in job 
satisfaction increases between rural and urban, there is more 
discrepancy between the perception of job satisfaction among 
these. It is the information delay since the brain needs some time 
process the information and built the perception. so this ratio 
represents relative perceived job satisfaction in terms of actual 
job satisfaction in rural to actual job satisfaction in urban. If the 
ACTUAL JOB SATISFACTION IN RURAL and ACTUAL JOB 
SATISFACTION IN URBAN is lower  than 1, the SEMI-
EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN RURAL and EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN RURAL migrate from rural to urban location and 
if the ratio is greater than 1, the SEMI-EXPERIENCED 
DOCTORS IN URBAN and EXPERIENCED DOCTORS IN 








It is an inflow rate that increases the patients at public hospitals in 
rural every year. it represents that only fraction of rural 
population gets ill every year and only few seek medical 
attention. It is defined as the flow of patients coming to the 
hospitals for treatment.It accumulates the STOCK OF 









This is the primary outflow from the patients at public hospital in 
rural. It represents the outgoing patients after being recovered 
from the public hospital. The outflow is controlled by presence of 
the patients in public hospitals in rural multiplied by the fractional 









it represents the number of patients treated in terms of per rupee 
income relative to the STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENTS 
to measure the Work Pressure in terms of monetary units in rural. 
The doctor workload pressure is the ratio between the INCOME 
FROM EACH PATIENTS TREATED IN RURAL TO 
STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENTS. If the ratio is lower 
than 1, there is more work pressure meaning the doctors get the 
less amount of money treating more number of patient, which 
results to decline in job satisfaction and if it is greater than 1, 




of money treating less number of patient, which results to more in 









it represents the number of patients treated in terms of per rupee 
income relative to the STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENTS 
to measure the Work Pressure in terms of monetary units in urban 
The doctor workload pressure is the ratio between the INCOME 
FROM EACH PATIENTS TREATED IN URBAN TO 
STANDARD INCOME PER PATIENTS. If the ratio is lower 
than 1, there is more work pressure meaning the doctors get the 
less amount of money treating more number of patient, which 
results to decline in job satisfaction and if it is greater than 1, 
there is less workload meaning the doctors get the more amount 
of money treating less number of patient, which results to more in 








It is the ratio of actual compared to standard patients in order to 
represents the relative work pressure in URBAN area. If the 
RATIO OF ACTUAL TO STANDARD PATIENTS IN URBAN 
is greater than 1, this indicates that the more patients are to be 
treated by doctors than the specified standard number of patients 
increasing the workload pressure but if it is less than 1, there is no 









The doctor workload pressure is the ratio between the actual 
patients treated per doctor and the standard patients handled per 
doctor. Workload pressure value is less than one implies actual 
patients treated is declining with more recovery while if it is 
greater than 1, this indicates that the more patients are to be 
treated by doctors than the specified standard number of patients 
increasing the workload pressure. 
STANDARD_INCOME
_PER_PATIENTS 
500  rupees/person 
This is an exogenous variable. The value is an average value paid 



















0.5  DMNL 
There are several determinants of job satisfaction such as pay, 
work motivation,workload, integration as stated by Agho, A.O., 
Price , J.L, & Mueller ,C.W. (1993) in Determinants of Employee 
Job Satisfaction : An Empirical Test of Causal Model. Human 
Relations, 46 (8): 1007-1027.  
So, we have assigned the weight as 50% based on the response 
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